

WHAT WAS THE ORIGINAL GOSPEL
IN 'BUDDHISM'?

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
by

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
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TO
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
'tato uttari desayi'

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY	9
1. THE FOUNDER AS INSPIRED	14
2. WORDS NEEDED AND WORDS MAKESHIFT	23
3. DEITY, SOUL, SELF, SPIRIT, IN INDIA	32
4. DHAMMA AS MANDATOR	44
5. OVER-ESTIMATE OF ILL; UNDER-ESTIMATE OF DESIRE	52
6. THE WAY IN THE WORLDS	61
7. WHICH WAS THE QUEST?	71
8. THE AIM; THE GOAL	77
9. JHĀNA AS I SEE IT	85
10. WAYS OF DIVINE LIVING	92
11. GOTAMA OR BUDDHA?	97
12. THE MASTER'S SILENCES	106
13. IS MAN A MERE COMPLEX?	111
14. SYMPATHY	119
15. JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT	122
16. THUS FAR	125
APPENDIX - 'JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT'	131
INDEX	145



INTRODUCTORY

IN SO FAR as the group of religious ideas called 'Buddhism' is conceded to have a history – and I have seen this denied by one or two! – it is generally held, that the earliest known stratum of this group, born in India and thence transplanted to South Asia, came to be known as Hīna-yāna (the lower 'vehicle'), otherwise called Theravāda (opinion of the elders). Further, that this developed, in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, into what came to be known as Mahā-yāna (the great 'vehicle'), or further teaching, revealed at first to a chosen few (and by them handed on to a chosen few), coming to be deemed fit for more general presentation in the fullness of time.

Now I am not denying that Mahāyāna presents what may be termed a developed teaching. But I deny that it is a development of Hīnayāna. This in a way is too modest a claim. I hold that Mahāyāna's roots go deeper than that. Both it and Hīnayāna are, in their several deeply opposed ways, developments. Each is a development from an older, an original teaching, given in the first instance as a divine inspiration.

There is in Hīnayāna tradition no esoteric teaching. In one context the Founder is shown earnestly repudiating it.

My belief is that Mahāyāna began when, the development of Hinayāna in India, then known as the 'opinion of the Analysts', having come into power in the Buddhist provinces of North India, this opinion was met by and protested against by delegates from Vesālī, the capital of the Vajjians. These delegates maintained that the Founder of their faith had insisted on the reality of the very 'man', spirit, self or soul, which the Analysts had come to deny. Come to be in a minority, they were expelled from the 'order' (*sangha*). It only remained for them to go back to lay life, or, like the Nestorian Christians later, expelled at the Council of Ephesus, to take themselves and their religious earnestness eastward. I read that men, called by some equivalent of 'Buddhists', first reached China (not as delegates but as independent of all save loyalty to their gospel) about 218 B.C., not very many years after the Patna expulsions. But the first invited 'official' deputation of monks from India only arrived A.D. 6. These will have brought the monastic 'Hinayāna' Buddhism nearly two centuries after that earlier, more original Buddhism had got a start. The Buddhism taught by that deputation will have been in many essentials opposed to, and was probably absorbed by, the more original Buddhism for which those earlier missionaries stood; that is, if my hypothesis about them is historically correct.

Thus I see the dual development of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism to have been of this sort: Hinayāna 'developed' in India away from its

origins, all the quicker through the 'purge' from its fold of the members who openly stood for the original teaching. It was a development in what, for a religion, I see as a worse, not as healthy growth. Mahāyāna 'developed' in China (later, in Japan, &c.) on a healthier basis derived from a beginning nearer to original Buddhism, but will have undergone a Hīnayānist infusion¹ from missions from India sent subsequently. But an infusion not sufficiently strong, or sympathetic to the Chinese temperament to eradicate the healthier beginnings.

What then was that original Buddhism from which both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism, but especially the former, have largely turned aside? My object in this little manual is to put on one side both of those varieties, together with all the legendary matter we associate with the life of Gotama called the Buddha, and state here certain results of much and long weighing of evidence, results which seem to me to be less of monastic accretions, and more of the original beginnings, such as the time and place in which his teaching took birth made both possible and plausible. In the developed monastic and pessimistic Hīnayāna we are, to quote Hermann Oldenberg, 'in a different world' from the teaching of Immanence accepted in Indian religious training in the sixth century B.C. Oldenberg put the *beginnings* of the teaching in that different world, as other pioneers have done. Here I believe we are now in a position to say they were wrong. We must, to get

¹ Not omitting the influence of older native cults.

at historic truth, replant the original New Word in the soil from which it sprang.

To do this, we must, in our documentary sources, ever be reading 'between the lines'. These sources, the best we have for our purpose, are the so-called Three Piṭakas, or Caskets, containing a Canon of scripture in a literary diction of a middle Sanskrit called Pali, a word which, I hold, refers, not to a people or region, but just to the 'row' (cf. our 'paling') in which, as a late novelty, India was seeing the so long *spoken* mandate take shape, not in air only, but in space. Most of the sections in the Piṭakas, not all, bear the stamp of matter handed down orally, not composed by the writer. Herein they differ from the Sanskrit Sūtras or discourses of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which are more of the nature of literary compositions.

These Pali books are a very curious mixture of monastic teaching, with much matter suggestive of earlier Indian literature *apparently left in*, matter often more or less in conflict with the main emphases in the Canon.

In this manual I have confined myself mainly to these 'left-ins', only indicating briefly wherein they are in conflict with those main emphases. Taken together they amount to a set of brief restatements of teaching now *not* ranked as original Buddhism; they are an effort to set old stones in relief; they are shown as reefs emerging from the water pointing to a submerged Atlantis beneath. Just wherein, I have been asked, does your view differ from what is held

as orthodox in so-called early Buddhism? All this I have been trying to bring out for a decade; here I have taken out for restatement that which is most salient in difference.

If where I see differently could be put into a phrase, it is that I see, in Gotama's New Word, a More than is contained in Buddhist manuals. These estimate Buddhism as an atheist or antitheistic gospel of self-saving, of protest, of moral emphasis, of insight into the worlds as evil and life as best ended, of universal compassion. I see it as a More than this. *This*, as religion, is mainly a Less. I am reminded of the effect of *that* on a man, Anuruddha, who heard it from his cousin the Founder: he is shown as saying, 'When in me he saw the willing mind he taught me More than *this*.'

Every religion worthy of the name teaches man a More about himself, not a Less, not a Worse. There once was in Buddhism this More in man, brought as a New Word to men. This More can now be learned, as never before, by those of willing mind, in scriptures made more fully accessible. The scripture, it is true, is fuller of the Less than of the More. But the More is there for him who reads as he runs. And for me it shows, that Buddhism, at its birth, was a gospel meriting to take rank with its great sisters. At the present day, in its South Asian form, it does but hang on the fringes of the world-religions, as being scarcely more than an atheistic system of ethics.

THE FOUNDER AS INSPIRED

How did what we now call Buddhism start? What are we told in scriptures about it? That which is so called was for centuries known in India as the 'teaching' or 'saying' (*-vāda*, *-vidyā*) of the Sakyan or Sakkan, a man, that is, of the clan (mainly in Nepal) to which the founder, Siddhattha Gotama, belonged. It is with him and what he is alleged to have done and said, that scripture and manuals are rightly concerned. A world-religion begins as the new message brought by a man of whom, before he became messenger, the world, his world, had not heard. We inquiring become intimately concerned with this man. He is, it may be, not a super-man, not a saintly man, but in one way he will be, as we say, outstanding; he will be pre-eminently a man of will. Why? Because to him, in some way, there comes a message not for himself alone, but for his fellows; and not for a few among these, but for 'men', for the Many. And to make known to these that message calls for no ordinary exercise of undaunted, persistent, devoted will. And more: *this* message was vitally and intensely concerned with man's will, more so than in the case of other Helpers' messages. For it was a call to men

to up and come to be; it was a call to grow and to will to grow, to choose, to seek salvation. It was of all gospels supremely dynamic. It was not a call to him to impose his will as guide and leader on other men; it was a call to his will to beget, to evoke will in each man.

The will, that is, in the very man, the man-in-man; the religious will. This is not in aim the will to greater bodily or mental efficiency; it is the will in spiritual becoming, with uttermost welfare of spirit as ultimate goal. Now to get past body and mind to the very man, to man as source of will, the messenger in religion will not utter words about mind, about ideas; he will speak about life, about living, since it is in living that spiritual becoming in man can be furthered.

Here it is already, that I part company with Buddhists and manuals, yes, and with scripture itself. By these, in these, especially in the last, the messenger is shown as super-wise, as the chooser, and the ultimate Aim has been split up into a group of ideas as to how to win it. The man of the Many has been thrust aside by this dominating personality, and his becoming from actual imperfection to his potential perfection has been obscured. We shall not get at this gospel if we take each passage of scripture at its face-value. We have to weigh one passage with another to see what lies beneath that. What does this face-value tell us?

Buddhists and books represent him as moved at

home by the facts of disease, old age and dying to 'renounce the worldly life', study the truths of life under teachers, and eventually (after six years) to begin to teach as missionary with fellow-missioners. What he should teach is told as come at somehow by himself during much meditation under a tree. Here 'enlightenment', i.e. knowledge, traditionally assumed to be all-knowledge, 'arose' in him. After a week (or was it four weeks?) of 'happiness', he hesitated as to what it was worth while to teach. Omniscience here failed to help. The vision, to him clairvoyant, clairaudient, of a deity (?) urged him to teach 'dhamma'.¹ He decided to do so and sought fellow-seekers, giving them in outline the teaching of man as able to choose a 'middle way', this leading best to what, in his religious quest, he was seeking: *attha*; 'aim'. This is spread out into four terms: enlightenment, higher (i.e. psychic) knowledge, calm, waning out (nirvana). The mission was forthwith begun.

It will be seen, that nothing as to *what*, as 'dhamma', he was to teach is recorded as uttered by the 'deity'. Apparently that business is assigned to the tree-musing. Insight into the arising of, and way of riddance from 'ill', already in terms of formula, are there accredited to him. In the hesitation he is shown, strangely, as torn in two between two gospels, either of which men were said to be too hide-bound to receive. Neither of these is made

¹ In such a context, this 'much-saying' word will have meant just 'religion', or 'what was right', what *ought* to be.

central in the outline he drew up:¹ neither an austere ideal of renunciation, nor the taking the fact of causation as a guide. Only the latter of the two is, without sequence, brought implicitly only, into the outline, in a diagnosis of 'ill' and of its cure; namely, of its nature, cause, stoppage and means to this.

So much for the face-value in the story. Everyman as willer is left out. Worth in his spiritual growth is left out. His wisdom is shown implicitly in following an all-wise willer and wayfarer towards the goal. Man's will here is that of the sheep. We fall back frustrated.

Now I do not claim, that any restatement of this episode: enlightenment, hesitation, vision, decision and utterance can make this ancient and obscure record a simple, uncomplicated matter. But I do claim, that by the correction of what is for me a faulty translation, we may supplement what appears as a mere urge to teach by a positive mandate inspiring the messenger. The correction may lend consecutiveness to the moment of decision, and may, though indirectly, set up a connexion between that mandate and the 'first utterance'.

The deva is recorded as humbly saluting Gotama and, in urging him to teach, as pleading, that whereas men are in a decline, *bhavissanti dhammassa aññātāro*. (In the accompanying verse we get the slight variant: *desetu dhammam; aññātāro bhavissanti*.)

¹ Usually called 'the first sermon', but in the legend, 'the turning the Wheel of Dhamma'.

These words we all, myself included, have translated as 'there will be they who will understand the teaching', or, in the verse: 'teach the teaching! there will be they who understand.' And I had this subconsciousness, that the true which is the new may not at once be received, but the day will come, &c.

Then I came to see, that *aññātāro* meant, not so much understanders, knowers, as learners, men coming to know, the verb *ā-ññā* meaning *connaître*, not *savoir*, *erkennen*, not *wissen*. This, if it did not go far, lent a less remote interest to the deity's entreaty.

But it came to me further, that the verb *bhavisanti* might not merely mean the copula between learners and future existence ('there will be'). Was it not rather the alternative opposite to 'are in a decline', namely, 'will become', i.e. 'will grow'. Often in the Buddhist records do we find this contrast drawn: on the one hand a worsening, on the other a growing, when the Better is followed. The verb 'become' always steps out of its way to mend the defective verb 'be' in the future tense. But it is also used in its fuller meaning: 'will come to be', will result in, e.g. 'Shall I become in the future, or not become?'¹ And I thought, was there not here the inspiring of a gospel, wherein the main thing to be sought was, not the contrast 'ill' and 'end of ill' (of the formula in the outline), but man's growth, man's becoming, and so man's salvation? Was there not here an expansion

¹ This is also an Upanishadic usage. Cf. *To Become or not to Become* (1937), pp. 108 f.

of the idea in the current religious teaching of that day:—‘That art thou?’ Was it not truer to say of man, with all his imperfections heavy on him, That art thou becoming?

Then I saw for the first time the context of the lotuses in the pool seen at all stages of growth as fit sequel to the word of inspiration. Even as they, so was each man at a different stage of growth towards full efflorescence. So too, as the man, full primed with his new word, moved away to find his friends and co-missioners, did the quaint one-worded response of the ascetic in the way *take on new meaning*—the word *huveyya* (or *huperyya*) usually rendered: Maybe! This, more properly, meant may (or might, or should, or ought to) become; (Man) may become! (Had the speaker wished to say ‘may *be*’, the word was at hand.) We do not really know what Gotama said to him, when asked the cause of his radiant mien. The self-eulogy in the records we must rule out, work of adoring after-men, but unfit as spoken by a man too great to call himself great. But if he told the inquirer of what had come to him from the Beyond: that man, as more rightly a becomer, than a being, was as such *bound to win* to that *Āmātā*, that Immortal, of which the records speak, why then, the ascetic’s response takes on meaning.

It may be said: ‘Does your restatement connect the inspiring message (and following decision) any better with the outline of teaching? We do not see that it does.’

I might reply, that neither is there obvious

sequence between inspiring message and initial New Word in the Jesus-gospel:—‘This is my beloved son . . .’ ‘The kingdom of the heavens is within you.’ Yet in our case I venture to see something nearer a connexion than in the usual translation. Thus: the outline declares, that a man chooses the way whereby he wills to attain his Aim (*attha*) in his spiritual quest. In so doing he is in a state of becoming. There is nothing static about such an attitude, about such conduct. Crude fragment, with adulterated opening,¹ such as is all we have left of that Outline, it is unmistakably a call to the man not to remain where he stands, but to go forward, that is, to grow, that is, to become. The blossoming of the relatively static plant, the lotus, had in that brief interval come to be felt as less fitting for the man than the *moving forward in wayfaring*.

There is even so, I admit, not an obvious connexion between hesitation, message, decision and outline of teaching. But is the very true always obvious? Must we not, to see truth, often get below the surface to the very springs of man’s nature, life and destiny, and discern, as here, that as essentially dynamic, he must fare forward or backward; that to do the former he becomes what he was not; that to be so, he wills, that is, he chooses?²

There is yet this to say: In that he needed urging by That Who sees where he at the time saw not, the

¹ It has been twisted into an address to monks only.

² If it be objected: Then why does neither of these words occur? let the reader wait for pp. 30, 32.

Helper is shown as not self-sufficient. He gave, I said, a call, but to him first a call came. Either the episode was told by him – no witnesses are mentioned – or it is pure fiction. But it is not, as of him, wholly unique. In reply to questions: How came you to know this? he would say: 'A deity (*devatā*) told me', with, it is true, the pious gloss: 'and I knew it of myself'. (Were the latter clause genuine, there had been no call to give the former.) And we read, that he was psychically gifted and in frequent communion with the unseen, finding 'pure happiness' in this. Adherents look upon him as attaining enlightenment alone, as just the automatic fruition of his own resolves and efforts in countless past 'lives'. Yet there has been left, in this moving record, of the Hesitation, the inspiring message, giving the lie to the ideas, that the messenger was all-wise, all-knowing, a self-dependent orphan in the universe. Like other great Helpers he was instrument, medium of a More than himself; wise he was but not all-wise.

It is a curious myopia of both sectarianism and science or scientism, that in the one there is shown in a creed but one inspired Helper, all-sufficing, absolute, in the other, prophets, founders in the past as evolving creeds out of some form of illusion, something vaguely called animism: the dream, the ecstasy, the hysterical vision, natural phenomena: any and everything save the message brought by man in the unseen to man in the seen.

For me we have the truth about it in the first half of that verse in the Epistle to the Hebrews: 'God

who at sundry times in divers manners hath spoken . . .’ But to man *in all ages*, ‘primitive’ or relatively cultured, not to one only, not to one class of instrument only. The truth herein does not render invalid the resolves, the efforts. The instrument is therein being ‘rough-hewn’, or ‘gently led’. But instrument he is all the time. And what he first utters as New Word will have been ‘that which is given him to say’; he will not speak by formula, by code. His lips have been touched with ‘burning coal from the altar’. He had felt his own weakness and hesitated. But from that moment he is ready: ‘Here am I; send me!’¹

¹ Isaiah vi. 8.

WORDS NEEDED AND WORDS MAKESHIFT

BOOKS AND BUDDHISTS say, that 'early Buddhism' (or just 'Buddhism') has little or nothing to say about God and the soul. That is to say, about either term as we have come to understand it. This clause should always be added. It rarely, if ever, is added. But even if we get ourselves into the religious atmosphere of India of 600 B.C., the assertion is not true. There is much, in even early Buddhism, of permanent value about God and soul to be found. I shall go more fully into this in the next chapter. There is no solid truth in labelling Gotama's teaching as anti-theistic, or anti-animistic, or a turn for the better as coming up only in Mahāyāna. It is quite true that, in the history of Buddhism, the belief in Deity and the soul may be seen going through a serial worsening. I shall return to this. I refer to it here to claim, that with a fully accepted Immanent Theism, and the accepted belief that the man *was* soul, did not *have* a soul, the immediate and central concern of his teaching was not an (unneeded) emphasizing of the reality of either. It was the relation between the two terms. Now this was a new emphasis, and it called for special words.

In his sets of terms, his grammars, man, in

contrasting his much and most, his good and best, his high and highest, has inserted his 'more', his 'better', his 'higher'. Now the cultural teaching of India had been saturated with a contemplation of the positive term as being in a way identifiable with the corresponding superlative term. But the reformed teachings of the Jains and of the Sakyans (as Gotama's followers were called) concentrated, not on these extremes, but on the middle term, the comparative. That is on the more, the better, each in their different way.

For thoughtful believers there was a danger in too lightly accepting identity of the actual human with the divine self. Between the two lay a great, a very long process of 'becoming' before man could realize what it was in his essential nature to come to be. It called for a 'training' requiring not one little life only but very many lives. This becoming, if it was not to be, as our poet has said, a 'rough-hewing' only, implied in that training, the will, the choosing to become, and the sustained outcome in endeavour.

On this willed work in becoming the earlier Buddhist Sayings, as collected in the Pali Canon, show a teaching that spent itself in utmost iteration and insistence. And there is this too – true motto of the wayfarer – it is the step further that is emphasized, rather than the Way's End. This was at first not lost sight of in a 'waning out' (nirvana), as came to be the case. It was the Further, the Beyond that was stressed; the 'what is there yet to be done?' What is the next in the More? 'As for me,' a leader

of men repeats in one Saying, 'I am for a More.'

I shall, I repeat, return to the two opening terms presently. Here I have a word to say on the handicap which befell the new gospel; – not this gospel only – one to which Buddhists and books do very scant justice.

This concentration on the need in religion to cultivate, to evoke man's potency to transcend such of a 'good', a 'much' that he had, to live for a Between rather than (immediately) for a Beyond, was a *New Thing in Indian culture*. And the New may need new words. We feel this with every one of to-day's wonderful inventions. India could not speak of 'potential' and 'actual', as we of Greek tradition can. Nor could she wield so radically strong a word as we can in 'will'. Strong terms she had had: they were degenerating, or obsolete. Terms of implicit will she had, but chiefly they meant ways of thought. A term of super-will she had – *iddhi* – but it meant chiefly accomplishment of will: all this I have gone into at length elsewhere. I have called Buddhism a gospel of will, without a fit word for will. As in other primitive cultures, India had seen in man mainly an observer, a thinker, a namer. In religion she was more preoccupied with self-control, than with free play of energy, with the negative aspect, than with the positive. So she tied down her Aryan root *WAR* to express the former aspect more than the latter. Maybe she forgot the lesson of her long trek into a new home, as her Western kin did not. Latin and Teuton developed

the kindred root WAL into VOLO and WILLE, with a preference for the positive, and in action a markedly different result.

Yet in things spiritual it was India who first saw that man is by nature not a static still-stander, but a dynamic becomer; that he is ever in a quest seeking to become what he was not before. In her need to express this message, inspired in a teacher whom, in the Upanishads, we cannot identify, she lit on her word BHŪ, to become, a richer word, not defective like AS, to be. It is in this word that the Sakyan strove to make good what we can express by 'potential' and 'actual'. That unknown teacher's message is worded – whether originally so or not – as the bidding man to see and 'know', that God was the very self of him. *We* could word this statement, irrational as it stands, as 'Potentially you are That. Actually you have' – as the scriptures admit – to 'become God' (*Brahmam bhavati*).

It was this long Between of Becoming that the Sakyan missionaries spent themselves in teaching. 'Tell yourselves,' we are ever reading, 'this and that will we become; thus must we train ourselves in what lies further!' And to the philosopher's questions: Does all really exist, or does it not? Is the doer the very same as the experiencer of result, or is he another? came, as we read, the reply: 'Neither' . . . and then: 'he is becoming', the answer, muffled, alas! in a church-formula, yet in terms that show one thing as proceeding, *from* not just *after*, another.

At first sight the question naturally arises: Why

was not the recorded reply in terms as simple as the inquiries? 'Thereby hangs a tale', I answer, and it is the history of the word for becoming. A monastic vogue was arising in India, wherein life in earth or any heaven, let alone hell, was taught as most undesirable (so much so that a tendency in the monk-world to suicide is recorded). But in the original teaching, the hereafter had been brought very near. 'Lives' in this and that 'world' were not only facts, but opportunities for becoming in the More, the Better, leading ultimately to the Highest Aim (*paramattha*). Now there was no plural form of 'life'; what we find is 'former dwellings' and, later, 'births'. Again, it was not in the sixth century B.C. customary to use 'worlds' in the plural. It very rarely is found; periphrases are plentiful. It was convenient to speak of both 'lives' and 'worlds' as 'becomings' (*bhavā*).

So, with the worsening in the outlook on 'life' and 'other worlds', this word *bhava* fell from its earlier meaning of good luck, success, growth, to mean something despicable and vile, a filthy thing. Hence later editors had to get round it in their oldest Sayings, and they shrouded it in a monastic formula about the arising, the 'becoming', of Ill.

How much depended here on the need of a 'make-shift' term! I do not say, that the greater need to speak of lives and worlds was the chief cause; it was rather an effect than a cause, or at least an accident in idiom. Vilification of *bhava* as becoming occurs not only with the word in the plural. With the

growing pessimism, it was becoming in the religious world habitual to see life and world as something ephemeral, transient, impermanent. And 'becoming' became identified with this; it was *anitya*, *aniccha*: not-lasting. The 'accident' in language aided in pulling down 'becoming'.

The reaction against the notion of 'becoming' as a truer ideal than 'being' arose, as we can see, in academic religious teaching, and possibly just when the Sakyan missions were beginning. Irrationally the schools pointed out that, as in things material maturity was followed by decline, so also it is in the immaterial, the spiritual man. But meanwhile the missionaries going out to the students of the former generation, who had then become 'house-fathers', citizens, found a lay-world, knowing nothing of this recoil, and ready to hear how the ideal of Immanence, which they had been taught, could be expanded into a gospel of a potential Becoming That by way of living or conduct. But again, a later generation of missionaries will have found men come from teachers of that recoil, and as more ready to mistrust an ideal of Becoming. We find this sharply debated in Asoka's day in the Pali book of Debates.

But not in Asoka's rock-edicts. Here, far from monastic squabbles, we are in the layman's creed which has remained true to the original teaching brought to the layman three hundred years earlier. Here is no dispute as to the reality and importance of 'becoming'. 'All cults desire salvation by becoming (*bhava-sūdhi*)' is in the edicts a refrain.

Then as to the makeshifts for 'will'. Here is no space to discuss the absence of a term for man's radiant energy considered as his active self-expression. In threshing out this matter, I have tested the want by contrasting the powerfully terse saying of Jesus: 'I will! Be thou clean!' Here is no *subsequent* energy or effort of efference *in act*. That followed. But I know of no equally revealing word of pure will, as such, in the Buddhist or preceding literature. Jesus had it in Aramaic and used it (*savena!*).

But as if to make good, we find in the former books a marked increase in the use of terms for effort, endeavour, energy, striving: all words expressive of the putting will *into action*. A list of such terms in the catechetical Sayings is only surpassed in length by the equivalents for the word 'wisdom',¹ in India ever of the highest importance. The compound 'with stirred up energy' is of frequent occurrence in matters spiritual. A phrase 'being or proceeding under *vāsā*': power or control, is also idiomatic, though omitted from that list. At the best these are but terms, not for 'will', but for *modes of using will*.

It is also noteworthy, that nowhere in this list is there reference to the more affective or emotional aspect of will which we express by desire, want, wish, longing, craving and the like. One word for desire, *chanda*, stood on the borderline between will that was laudable and will as monastically reprehensible.

¹ *Parjñā, paññā*.

It came to be made presentable by the prefix *dhamma* – or salved by the equivalent: ‘wish to do’ (*kattu-kamyatā*). But for the saint it was something done with, unwanted. It is not impossible that, had the infant ‘Buddhism’ remained clear of monk-dominance, either a worthy term for will might have been found, or a term of affective consciousness been raised to a more honourable position. But that dominance had the effect of lowering all words indicative of bare will, or of will with a co-efficient of emotion and idea. *Ichā*: want, wish, is very rare; *kāma*, once strong as ‘will’, was degraded into sex-desire; *kratu* was dropped. And words for choice,¹ resolve, decision, &c., are oddly absent, or come later into use.

But at least the makeshift terms of effort remained in honoured usage. Quiescence and calm also commanded perhaps a growing appreciation, but the Buddhist monks, for all the harm they wrought on the earlier teaching, never, in their Sayings, lost sight of their life as an active quest in developing themselves – they called it ‘making become’, ‘more-becoming’² – into what they optimistically conceived was possible in earth-life: the man perfected; or arahān (literally, ‘worthy one’).

To sum up: the New Word inspired in Gotama needed such words as potential and actual; needed such words as will and choice. In the carrying on

¹ Choose (*vunoti*), e.g., can be shown as evaded by ‘take’, and ‘don’, where we would have said ‘choose’ and ‘select’ respectively.

² *Bhīyyobhāva*.

the increased use of the word-group 'becoming', we discern a fine alternative to the former pair of terms. In the strenuous use made of terms for effort and energy we discern a noteworthy, if less effective makeshift for the latter pair. I should rather have said: 'we *may* discern'. Actually, I have noted so far a failure on the part of Buddhists and books to take note of the way in which the first teachers, needing certain words for their new message, made shift with words that were to hand. And until such note is taken, in and by a better knowledge of the Pali scriptures, there will not, I believe, arise a right understanding of what that new message was.

DEITY, SOUL, SELF, SPIRIT, IN INDIA

LONG AGO, when the utterances, recorded as the first two spoken by the founder of Buddhism, came into my hands, I was puzzled, in the second, by the curiously alien way in which for me, a European, the soul or self (*attā*) was discussed. It said that, since the body, since the mind was liable to limitations, 'the self' could not say in either case: 'Let me be thus and thus.' (Note here the reluctance in Indian idiom to use the word 'choose': *vuṇoti*. We should have said: I choose to be thus and thus.) It seemed to my Western mind, that, unless I had an Arabian genie coming out of a bottle and granting my every wish, I could not, even with an unlimited 'self', be or do as I chose, as were I God. It was many years later, and after I had come to know the Upanishadic teaching, that I discerned, how in this passage the word 'self' meant no mere human self, as we know him, but a divinely omnipotent self or soul, blended with, inseparable from, the actual human self. Once I had got the true setting of the picture, the sense became clear. The self in question was not that merely human self; it was the human self who, in the current, the accepted teaching, had undergone a tremendous uplift, a transformation into immanent

Godhead. It was only as handicapped by having to express himself 'here below' through body and mind, that this divinely potent Man was unable to work His will and be what or how He chose.

With that true setting for the teaching, it then became clear that the object of the utterance was clearly to warn the new fellow-teachers never to identify the self, soul, very man, with his parts or instruments, namely, body or ways of mind. They were to see, that 'this' (body, mind) 'is not of Me, that I am not it, that for Me it is not the self'.¹

But the Buddhist inference from it has for centuries been the adding: this self being neither body nor mind, there is no self.

Logically this is quite unwarranted. Let us examine and weigh it with other contexts, occurring as often as it does. One is an elaborated formula called the view of man-as-he-is (*sa-kkāya*; lit., being-group). The self, it says, is never found identifiable in any of several ways with body or mind. E.g. neither body, or mind, is the self, nor has the self, nor is in the self, nor is the self in either. Never, here or in our context, is it stated, 'therefore there is no self'. The same is true of another oft-repeated argument, that since body and mind are impermanent, they are 'ill' or 'of sorrow', and hence cannot be identical with soul or self, Who was conceived in India as 'bliss'

¹ This (*Sāṅkhyā-kārikā*, §64) is not a denial of the self's existence; it is the rejection of any claim of matter to be considered as 'the self'. Cf. Nārāyaṇa's *Commy*.

(*ānand*). Nowhere is the argument clenched with the inference: hence soul is not.

A scholar friend¹ wrote to us years ago about this, finding in it the opposite inference implied, namely, that self or soul was, as compared with body or mind, real. I hold now he was right. But I then rejoined: Wasn't it an odd way of teaching that reality; to imply, not to affirm? For this ignorant remark I would now substitute the more intelligent one: There was in these utterances no intention of teaching the truth of soul's existence. Nor was there any need to do so. There was in that day no more need to teach that truth than there was for Jesus, in his day and land, to assert the existence of the Deity he taught as Father.

It is true that, even in Gotama's day, sophists among Brahmin teachers loved to dwell on contradictory alternatives: is it? is it not? and the like. We saw such inquiries above. But in the positive religious teaching of the Brahmin schools we are left in no doubt, that the self, as God-in-man, is. There, too, was also taught, in more positive terms, the warning, not, in the using and product of using, to lose sight of the user. Put aside, it was said, the speech, the act, the feeling. Look to the speaker, the doer, the feeler.

But to infer, as is done in so-called Southern Buddhism, that this warning implies 'he' as persisting user, is not, is condemned as wrong in Buddhist scripture itself. Here are two pieces of, for me, crucial

¹ Sir Charles Eliot.

evidence, but overlooked by Buddhists, whose ignorance of their Canon (only now in process of translation into South Asiatic vernaculars) must be met with to be realized. Here they are. (My own analogy condemning their logic was, as if, when seeking a ship's captain, we rejected boatswain and purser as not he whom we sought, we should infer, Then there's no captain. But it is fitter, in the Indian picture, to take an analogy put into the Founder's mouth:)

'I understand, Sacchāka, you say that "you" are no other than body and mind. . . . If you are just these, you are like a king (who is *ex officio* judge), considered as being no more than his subjects. As such he cannot dispose of their fate, their property. But he does so dispose of them. Therefore is he, as king-judge, *more* than they.' The Sutta, as I have pointed out,¹ is a most unhappily jumbled compilation, suggesting either many varying parallel versions for revisers to select from, or a felt need to 'get round' an awkward corner by revisers of altered values, or both of these. But the simile for me damns the belief in *an-attā*, the no-self.

So no less does the simile ascribed to Sāriputta, in the Second Collection.² Gotama's fellow-missioners discuss how, for each, their religion adds a beauty to the lovely moonlit evening. Sāriputta's choice is, that the wise man is seen as able to dispose of his mind-ways, no less than a well-dressed man disposes

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, 1937, 'An Overlooked Buddhist Simile'.

² *Majjhima*, No. 32.

of his wardrobe, in selecting now this suit, now that. Here is no merging of the man into his instruments, his clothes, no more than is the case in the later Bhagavadgītā, where the dying man 'puts off worn garments and goes to other, to new ones'.

Close also to the thought of his day and land is the first public utterance by the new teacher, when abruptly accosted by men of his own class seeking a pilferer: 'Sir, have you seen a woman passing by?' The reply as stated is: 'What have you, gentlemen, to do with a woman. . . . Were it not better that you were hunting for the self?' This is granted. 'Then sit down and I will teach you religion (*dhamma*).' And alas! follows not a word about the self, but a little stock piece of quasi-monastic homily.

The 'for the self' is, save by me, translated 'for yourselves'. The original is *attānaṃ*, the accusative singular of *attā*. And translators have sought to head off the question into one of Christian sentiment. We are here up against the difficulty of equating Indian with European idiom. The former uses no possessive pronoun with the reflexive pronoun. 'My-self' and the rest is never anything more than *attā* – just that – in any 'oblique' case, genitive, &c. (The use of self in the plural was only a later usage.) 'Your-selves' is then wrong. We give it nowadays a 'less' in meaning, in that we have come, in our world and our day, to see in 'self' a less than we are or should be, i.e. an egoistic person. But in early India this less-in-self is unknown. Ignorant Buddhists to-day uphold the 'no-self' doctrine, largely because they

see in self, 'selfishness'. Historically they are utterly wrong.

How then are we rightly to render the injunction? Not surely as a sardonic gibe to seek what could not be found. I do not hear a Helper of men speaking so. Let us rather turn to the accepted religious teaching of his day. In an oldest Upanishad, likewise in one possibly over a century later (or at least this portion of it), we read: 'What is within this town of Brahma' (as if to say this Godstead) . . . 'that is, the self . . . should be searched for, is what one should desire to know.' 'Him, this self' (a list of names of conceptions of Deity follows) 'assuredly one should desire to know. He should be searched for.'

'Were it not better that you hunted for the self?' Are we not with a better setting here for our picture than in smoothing down and out this word *attānam*, or in dragging in a gospel of other lands and other times? Let me only add, that my 'hunted for' is the same word as the 'searched for', but with the prefix 'cow-' (*gav-eyesātha*). Men hunting for lost cattle is a feature in Buddhist Suttas, and searching in a jungle was keen enough to merit the word 'hunt'. But what a wonderful 'left-in' it is by revisers! Left in it was by men who were banishing monks from the Order, if they did not subscribe to the 'Analysis' of man into a complex of his instruments! Yet most exponents of early Buddhism, refusing to read the word *attānam*: self, as they would read it, *were they translating it in the Upanishads*, ignore the episode, or trot out the European misreading.

This inconsistency in translating occurs again, and unanimously, over a, this time not ignored, injunction, ascribed to the Founder as among his last words, albeit not spoken then only. 'Live ye', he admonishes, 'as they who have the self-as-lamp, the self-as-refuge, who have *dhmma* as lamp, *dhmma* as refuge, and no other. Whoever, now or when I am gone, will so live will become that Peak of the immortal, so he be fain to train.'

Here, had these compounds 'self-as-lamp, self-as-refuge (*atta-dīpā*, *atta-saraṇā*) been translated for us, as they mostly are, when found in the Upanishad teachings of Immanence, they would have been rendered either as in this sentence, or as separate phrases: 'who have the Self (capital S) as your lamp', &c. Take, e.g., the well-known phrases: 'self-loving, self-enjoying, self-sporting, self-raptured' in the Chāndogya: all translations known to me render these by such phrases as 'who loves the Self, delights in the Self, has intercourse with the Self, rejoices in the Self'. No idea is there to bring in so misplaced a phrase as our word 'yourselves' for the Self would be. Yet when precisely analogous compounds occur in Buddhist Suttas, translators, English and German, agree in writing: 'be ye lamps unto yourselves, a refuge unto yourselves!' And the reader at-second-hand-only lays down the book impressed with the idea, that in Buddhism man has to 'look to himself' for salvation and to nothing higher than that – his actual present self.

Far be it from me to suggest that, in the original

teaching, Upanishadic or Sakyan, man had to be lifted, carried, dragged to salvation by a Greater than he. From the beginning his co-operation in choice of the better, in willing his 'becoming', is demanded. But that either teaching showed him as to be 'saved' in any real sense without the 'co-operation' of a Greater, a More than he, even that Most in whom he has faith, is to leave one's book with a lie.

This More, this Most early Buddhism taught *in this way*. It did not tell man, as did the Upanishads, that he *is* the Most, is so in just *knowing* this. It was ever showing the man as able to will himself into becoming a More. The word 'more-becoming' or 'more-state' (*bhīyyobhāva*) is quite overlooked in the manuals. The man as self was no cut-and-dried concept, but a composite picture in a scale of values, from the 'average sensual man' – to quote the French term – up to the highest conceivable, the 'Peak of the Immortal', *amat'agga*. Hereby it is that we get such a mixture of sayings about the self, as e.g. that who is to be trained, conquered, and who yet is man's protector (*nātha*) and man's goal or destiny (*gati*).

Maybe it is regrettable, that in our rendering of the word *ātmā*, *attā*, we have not consistently and persistently used, not soul or self, but spirit. There is, in both spirit and the Indian term the association with 'breath'. There is, in both Indian and New Testament scripture the same apparent ambiguity, e.g. in such passages as 'God is spirit'; 'he that is

joined to the Lord is one spirit'; 'spirit also helpeth . . . maketh intercession for us'; 'the spirit whereby we cry Father', and many more. The word 'self' has been too debased, by our choice of it for 'worse self', to be really an effective instrument for us to realize the Indian, the early Buddhist outlook. But in the worthier ambiguity of 'spirit', it becomes easier for us to see at once spirit and holy spirit, as did the Indian, in *ātmā*, see at once man as he is and as he potentially is. We might then not draw false conclusions in such Buddhist phrases as 'the self as witness of the self', 'the self as upbraiding the self'. (Only once have I found the distinction patently drawn where in the same Sutta we have 'great self' and little self, a distinction not unknown in the Upanishads; and there the distinction is not between man and Deity.¹) With this rendering of the Indian term, there might never have been the deplorable distortion of meaning involved in our use of 'self'. 'Seek the spirit' and 'spirit as lamp, as refuge' would have saved us much pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp.

One more proof from the Suttas, that early teaching never saw, in 'self', 'spirit', a fiction of speech I must adduce. It is the Sutta of the Three Mandates.² The religious man, anxious to get better results in his self-training, is shown as helped by three mandates: (1) that of the self: 'Stirred up for me shall unsluggish effort become; called up unmuddled mindfulness; serene shall body be and one-pointed the mind' . . . and having made just the self his

¹ *Anguttara*, i. 249.

² *ibid.*, p. 147 f.

mandate he 'perseveres in effort and cherishes a pure self'. Likewise in the other mandates (2) of the worthy, on earth and in the unseen, watching his career, and (3) of *dhamma*, whereof more presently. Is it not astonishing that a teaching with these sayings in its scriptures should be said to deny God and the soul?

Why then do Buddhists affirm that it does, calling it, the denial, the centre of their religious teaching?

The one true way to get at the emergence of this negative dogma is the historical way. I will sketch its growth as tersely as possible. First, a possible tendency, in the sixth century B.C. in North India, to see the entity 'I', human and divinely immanent, as body, as mind, shown by the warning 'the Self is neither'. Secondly, the tendency to construe this warning into meaning, that, body and mind being 'ill, changing, transient', to call either 'the Self' (divinely immanent) was illogical. Thirdly, the teaching, that 'the man', i.e. the 'I', could only be 'got at' in terms of bodily and mental phenomena. Fourthly, the more unqualified nihilism, that there is no 'self', without distinction, in anything whatever. Lastly, the pointing out, that such words as man, being, self were but a conventional convenience to name combined existing entities (factors of the human complex) by a name for a non-existing entity. We here range from the record of the Second Utterance down to the standard Pali manual compiled in the eleventh century A.D.

The three main causes of this gradually growing

nihilism I find (1) in the vogue of monastic life as commendable for persons not only aged, but of any age.¹ In its pessimism the waning out of the individual entity was deemed desirable, not his persistence and growth. (2) In the growing vogue in mental analysis, initiated in the lay movement known as Sāṅkhya, whereby preoccupation with mind killed in Buddhism the Immanence taken over in its first teaching. (3) In the gradually growing rift between the reforming daughter and her mother, as to matters of ritual and birth-monopoly, sweeping-in the mother's central religious teaching: a schism wider even than that between Catholic and Reformed Churches.

There is a very striking 'left-in' in the Fourth Collection, called both 'doing of self' or 'doer as self', which for me should be more of a poser to the upholder of the *an-attā* dogma than any other. It has so far been either ignorantly or wilfully overlooked. In it we have a man stating it as his opinion, that no doing (or doer) can be called 'self'. It would be thought, that if Buddhists are right as to the Master's teaching, Gotama would have readily endorsed this. Instead he is said to have replied, he had never heard of such a theory! And he goes on: Surely when you exercise initiative, in such a thing as bodily gesture, this is an act of the self, of you or of another self?

This testing of the presence in action of a doer, a willer, by initiative was a notable word. It

¹ This was a novel feature in N. India, much resented by the laity.

recognized, that will (with a makeshift term), used in its full sense as the whole inner activity of the normal man, is not merely a purposeful emergence in him *after* he has thought and felt. These are, rightly considered, the one a mode, the other a reverberation of will. The *start* in the man, in this or that, is the expression in him, ever recurring, of the More that he enters upon, as the essential expression of his nature. The start, initiative, it is that best shows him as 'becoming' rather than 'being'.

How then is the self so oddly denied, denied even to-day, in orthodox Southern Buddhism? I have heard it said there: it is not the conventional validity in the term in everyday speech that we deny; it is the unchanging permanent self surviving death, emerging in rebirth, that we deny. Or again, it is the moral obsession with personal interest – egoism – that we condemn. Or yet again, the 'no-self' is taught by one or more leading 'priests' as meaning, that in nature a mutual independence in things is untrue and impossible.

These are modern attempts in the monastic teaching, to soften the crudity of denying that the 'I', who write, who am criticizing, summing up, and so forth is no real entity, but a serial set of phenomena. But in the earliest Buddhism with which I am concerned, there was at first no distinction drawn between a permissible impermanent 'I' and its contradictory; no ethical notions of 'no-soul' being non-egoism or altruism; no metaphysic as to absolute independence.

DHAMMA AS MANDATOR

I HAVE REFERRED in the foregoing section to three 'mandates', *dhamma* being the third. The man in religious 'training' is made to say: '*dhamma*, as of present interest yet not a thing of earthly time only . . . known to the wise as *pratyātmā*', i.e. in the very soul. 'Now there is dwelling with me a fellow-student (*sabrahmacārī*) who knows who sees. If I, who have . . . a *dhamma*-rule so well proclaimed, should live slothful, careless, this would be for me unfit. He reflects thus: stirred up for me shall energy become. . . . He, having made just *dhamma* his mandate, cultivates the good . . . bears about the purified self.'

There then follow these remarkable lines:

Nought in the world of the doer of evil lies hid.
The self, O man, knows of thee what is true or false.
Ah sir, the lovely self, the witness, thou dost despise,
Who in the self hidest the self that is evil.¹

The worthy in this world and that see the fool unevenly walking.

¹ Cf. the verse in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, probably not far removed in date from this:

'The one God hidden in all things, all-pervading, hidden soul of all, Overseer of deeds, in all abiding, witness . . . standing in the self.'

Hence let him mindful walk, having the self as master.
Delicately let him walk, having the worlds as master.
According to *dhamma* let him walk, having *dhamma* as master.

Never doth falter the wise in that which is real advancing.

(Two more lines, disconnected in subject and value with these, are I think a later insertion.)

Is it impossible to equate this third mandate, or rather mandator by an English word? It is indeed not easy, so 'much-saying' is the term, so marked, in Buddhism, is the changing history in its worth. Readers will find the word carefully discussed in more works than one, both the Vedic *dharma*, and the Pali *dhamma*, the only historical study of the idea common to both forms being Dr. G. Mees's *Dharma and Society* (1935). For purposes of the present study one feature in that history should not be overlooked. Namely, that whereas in Indian pre-Buddhist literature *dharma* is rarely used, in the Pali Suttas there is scarcely a page without reference to it. What had taken place to bring about this change in emphasis?

Meaning basically fixed position, and so 'support', the word came to mean what had to be supported, maintained, observed. In the (later) *Fourth Veda*, the wish to commit suttee is for the newly-made widow 'an upholding of the ancient *dharma*'. And in one or two Buddhist Suttas *dhamma* is the standard or norm, the *noblesse oblige*, of the social caste or class.

In translating I clung to that word 'norm' as a

way out of the difficulty in finding an adequate equivalent. It was highly convenient metrically, and I disliked 'law', 'truth' and 'doctrine', the usual renderings, as not literally accurate. But norm was a bad fit when we compare such Suttas as the foregoing with another notable and also overlooked pair and discern the position assigned to it probably by the Founder Gotama himself.

It will be remembered¹ that, in the parting admonition to live in the light and refuge of the self, *dhamma* is placed beside self as equally light and refuge. These, *and nothing else*, are the twin fact by which man might attain the height of the immortal. Now in these two Suttas, the Founder is said, before beginning his mission, to have confessed that *dhamma* was the object of his adoration, or at least of his reverence. And here too *dhamma* is linked with the self. His confession receives solemn endorsement by a deity, who pronounces it, as true of all the awakened (*buddha*) past and to come, that they also do so no less:

All dwelt (their) *dhamma* honouring;
Do dwell and shall dwell; 'tis their way.
So he to whom the self is dear,²
Who longeth for the great self – he
Should homage unto *dhamma* pay.

Here is no mere norm to be 'upheld', the standard of the average decent man. Here is religious aspiration of the deepest kind to win to the yet unattained

¹ P. 38.

² One of the two reads 'the aim (*attha*) is dear'.

while traversing the More between It and present life. Here is not only in the term a sense of duty to a code or standard; here is a sense of the 'ought' within us; here is what we, with an inadequate word, call 'conscience' – inadequate since in it we have to express, not merely an 'inwyt', as we used to say, an insight, as to what should be done or not done, but also an urging Will at work on us. As our great playwright has it: 'Conscience! ay, that Deitie within my bosom.' And in the term I believe that Gotama saw an aspect of the divine Self which appealed to him as having a more dynamic, as having a less static meaning than the term 'self' could yield. Man had not just to know; he had to wayfare, to become in order to attain. He had, in a word, to live his religion.

I believe that, could it be possible for us to receive a true message from the ever-living Founder, it would be, that he tried to make men see in *dhamma* that Peak, that Height of the immortal (*amat'agga*), rather than in the word of his day: the Self. Reviewing the Suttas, we may say, that in them the word *attā*, put forward at the outset as the Aim, is for the sayings a survival, but that *dhamma* is an emergence quick with new emphasis. *Dharma* may be said always to have meant 'duty', or what ought to be, or be done, regulative or normative 'function'. But in these lines of earliest Buddhism, it is given the force, not only of duty, but of Mandator of duty. Just as the word 'thing' or 'things': the what is done, or may be done or brought to pass, is transcended in

the Ting, the Scandinavian parliament, in that it means a body of *men* considering the 'what may be done', so, in that first Buddhism, we have *dhamma* as meaning not only the 'ought', but *the Monitor inspiring it*.

This may to most seem forced. Let this then be borne in mind: the object of worship in that day of disdeified external gods, was still a Person, a Man – 'Brahma (neuter) worshipped as the Self (masculine)' – and not one or more ideas or abstractions of the Man, like our 'Good, True and Beautiful' and the like. And let the following lines be noted as suggesting a quasi-personal element in the worship of *dhamma*, in the little poem of 'Warding' ascribed to a monk called Dhammika. Beginning:

'Well doth *dhamma* protect him in sooth who *dhamma*
doth follow,'

he ends with:

Hence let a man put forward desire as to *dhamma*,
Delighting in finding in That so good a Wayfarer.
Persisting in *dhamma*, disciple of best of wayfarers,
Venturing, comes to the best and the highest of refuges.

With this compare the Mandates Sutta above: 'there is dwelling with me a fellow-student who knows who sees' . . . noting that the following verses make both self and *dhamma* an inwardly witnessing 'master' to be obeyed. And that final injunction cited above, coupling both as guiding light and refuge.

But there was a further emergence in the history of *dhamma*; I would call it threefold: (1) secular law, (2) natural law – or as is now fashionable ‘cosmic’ law – and (3) code or body of doctrine. The first has, if I err not, resulted in a (Buddhist) preference to translate *dhamma* by ‘law’ with a capital L. The second may possibly have worked in forming the concept under which Mahāyāna Buddhism places its supreme aspect of Buddha as God. It is the third which, already in Piṭaka compilation, defines *dhamma*, a list namely of the literary, and later scriptural forms in which ‘dhamma’ was handed down.

In it that most inward of all religious experience: the fact and prompting of ‘conscience’, has become externalized. The Inner Inspirer has become the outward code. To the question put to pupils of Ceylon, ‘What for you is *dhamma*?’ the answer given me was ‘The Sutta Piṭaka’. Hence the translator gives European readers the word ‘doctrine’ (capital D). Others choose the word ‘Truth’. The one is too objective, the other loses sight of the right subjective meaning. (There were several Pali words for truth to hand, had that been the meaning of *dhamma*.) Truth is ‘what is’; *dhamma* is ‘what ought to be’.

It is perhaps in the Asokan Edicts, rock-carven, that we may see this transition emerging. In them *dhamma* is defined not as a unitary body (*khandha*), much less as a force; it is a composite teaching. The question is: not What is *dhamma*? much less Who is *dhamma*? but how many (*kati*) is it? and the reply is

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sixfold: little of the bad, much of the good, kindness, giving, truth, purity. Yet is *dhamma* not morals (*sīla*), as it has unhappily been Englished by a German translator. The edicts say: 'A man must walk by *dhamma* if he would *become* moral (*sīlasi*). In the immoral there is no walking by *dhamma* . . . the king persisting in *dhamma*, in *sīla*, will teach *dhamma*.'

Let it be noted, that in these rock-cut sentences dating from the same generation which witnessed the council of Revision of Sayings at Patna, Asoka, in his definition, or description of *dhamma*, makes it clear that no body of formulated teachings was in his mind (or in that of his inscribers), such as we find *dhamma* frequently made out to be in the Suttas. *Dhamma* in the edicts is purely and entirely factors of what we may call the More in the man who is 'becoming'. When he is enjoining on the Order to listen and reflect upon their religion, he specifies certain *dhamma-paliyāyāni*. But there is no necessity to see, in the term, 'passages of scripture', oral or otherwise. It can equally rightly, more rightly perhaps, be rendered as 'religious instances', or 'discourses'. I am not denying, however, that at the council itself, presumably preceded by the carving of the edicts, *dhamma* was coming to mean the externalized body of doctrine, in which the meaning of the More in each man, ascribed to Gotama's use of the word, was merged.

I cannot think that, in naming as his sole successor '*dhamma*', he could have meant so man-handled a

collection of teaching as he will well have known was more or less in the hands, not of the faithful few at Vesālī, but of the New Men. It may be, it probably is, true that, waving aside all his contemporaries, such as the aged ascetic Kassapa, and all younger disciples, as tending towards the Sāṅkhyan canker of resolving the man into a mere complex, he named no human successor. But in each man there was That Who could suffice for religious guidance, the Inner Monitor. If the naming of a successor had been a legend invented by the aftermen, it would have been threefold, the trinity of Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha.

That he ever thought of *dhamma* as just an external code of doctrines is for me another matter about which I go not with Buddhists or books.

OVER-ESTIMATE OF ILL; UNDER-
ESTIMATE OF DESIRE

THE LEGENDS AGREE in showing the young laird Gotama at home much worried over things about which mankind may worry, but which it mainly takes in its stride resignedly; things which belong to life as known and to be expected; things from which as they come it seeks no special miraculous exemption. I mean of course, disease, old age, death. No mention in those tales is made about less predictable, if more formidable ills: earthquake, famine, flood, war. These were frequent enough in ancient India, and yet about these the sayings show little worry. It is those three, and those alone, about which the legend shows Gotama worrying, even as it is those three which in one Sutta are called the messengers of deva's.

But be it noted – and who so far has noted it? – that when in anguish Gotama is made to cry out in distress over the world's tragedy, the three have been in one respect altered: 'Woe is me at the world's evil pass in *births, ageings and dyings*; is there then no way out?' Here is surely the hand of the editing monk! For him, not marring and ending of life was the whole of the trouble; woeful was also the beginning of it.

Now this, save in very tragic times, is not the outlook of Everyman. Nor will it have been the outlook in a gospel expressly sent forth to Everyman. I have heard a European Buddhist 'vert', father of a family, say of Gotama: 'He taught men how to live so as not to be reborn.' His knowledge of scripture is of the most limited, else he would have known that this was the teaching of the monk-aftermen, not of the Founder. Him we find saying, he told his disciples (by psychic knowledge) of the happy fate of comrades who had passed on before them, in order that they might joyously strive to win a destiny not less happy. Now both of these sayings cannot be true of one and the same teacher, unless his teaching became inverted by himself or by others.

I am not sceptical about Gotama having worried over *man's dread* of illness, old age and death. Every thoughtful man and woman will have done that. But in so outstanding a man, I do query his calling for a remedy, for 'a way out', for just these things. And I query that when, to seek more wisdom on the subject - that and other serious subjects - he left home, this should be shown as his 'leaving the world'. It was nothing of the sort. He sought to learn from such wise men of whom he had heard. There is no legend that he, in youth and young manhood, went to a centre of Brahmin schools, such as was Taxilā. Some of us women are old enough to know how, similarly debarred in adolescence, we set out late, but at the earliest possible moment, to sit under the wise. He will have felt

athirst for 'wisdom', for the culture of his day, in that remote home in the hills. The view of life as needing a 'way out' was characteristically monkish, but it was not his way. He himself did not find life 'ill'; he is shown calling himself the happiest of men, and judging, that being obsessed by 'ill' was to be incapable of forming a right estimate of it.

It is true that, in a solitary context, Gotama is made to speak as if his teaching did lay great stress on 'ill' and the way out from that. I am inclined to think it was my citing it in a much read manual twenty-six years ago that taught many (lay) Buddhists there was such a context. It runs: 'Just this do I teach: ill and the stopping of ill.' I did not, at all events, so misread the Pali as to render it, as Buddhists do: 'This only do I teach . . .' The particle *eva* in older Pali does not eliminate the opposite; it only emphasizes the subject of discourse. A better rendering were: This verily do I teach. . . . To say, he *only* taught that is to eliminate much that Buddhists themselves maintain he did teach.

But I cannot for a moment concede he did teach even the qualified saying. A man, who set out teaching the Way to *attha*: 'the way going to joy' we find it called; a man, of whose disciples a king is reported to have said: Why is it that your disciples are so joyous as compared with other religious bodies? – this man will never have so concentrated on 'ill' as to call it *the* thing that he taught, whatever else he had to say.

With the growth of monasticism itself I have here

no space to deal, nor *with the decline of this obsession* when the monk became permanently established in Buddhist lands.¹

My restatement here about 'ill' consists mainly in this: that the facts of old age, disease and death are by no means worthy to be or likely to have been, the moving idea in a great world-gospel. It is not enough to object, that Buddhism only 'became' that in time. I am convinced, that in such a gospel, the inspiration given to its founder will have been from the first a mandate fit to be one needed just there and then by man, a mandate which was a new word about the nature, not of man's body and mind, but of the very man, the self, soul, spirit, the 'man-in-man'.

Buddhist scripture has so much harped on ill and on escape from it – not as a becoming supremely well, but as ending of ill – that this monkish outlook has blinded our eyes to the very much more that was its real New Word. There is such a thing as distress or 'dukkha' about one's *spiritual* well-being. We saw it in the preceding section on the three mandates.² The earnest seeker is distressed, not over bodily or mental 'ill', but at his lack of spiritual growth. And yet, even here, he clothes his worry in terms of those three forms of bodily 'ill'; it is they that continue to preoccupy him. There is nothing positive of welfare in any forward view in his aspiration; merely the negative 'end of ill'. It is, I have said, as if the Greek soldiers of Xenophon had called out, not, as they did, 'The sea! the sea!', but 'No more land! no

¹ Cf. *The Milinda Questions*, p. 29 f.

² See pp. 40 f.

more land!' It is, as the monk saw it, a gospel, not of the morning, but of the night. Now the founder of Buddhism, himself in a great Becoming, will not have bided bending over crutch, sick-bed and grave. He wayfared further.

It is possible that the word *dukkha* was never used for any ills beyond those of mind and body, especially body. The Concordance of the Piṭakas that is being prepared will for future research make this easy to decide. Yet we have before us already more than one context defining 'dukkha', notably the 'First Utterance'. Here we get, first, birth, disease, old age, dying – all four this time – then the mainly mental woe of union with the undesired, absence from the desired. And that, as we say, is the lot. Here is nothing that can be called distinctively spiritual ill. And the only ones 'harped upon' *ad nauseam* are a trinity of old age and dying, with birth and disease as alternative third:

Like forest fires behold them drawing nigh:
Disease, decay and death, dread trinity,

or the first two: 'old age and death come rolling in upon you; what is there that you can do?' or birth, that is rebirth, alone, as in the formula of the *arahan*: 'Waned out is birth; the god-life is lived; what was to be done is done . . .' I suspect that 'birth' here has replaced the probably earlier saying in some Suttas: 'Waned out for me is hell (*nirāya*) . . .' To make of this last the main factor of 'ill' transcends the legendary trinity. The hope which lies in all

religion save the Buddhism of the monk, the faith which looks to birth as a God-given opportunity for spiritual growth and, where reincarnation is taught a recurrent opportunity for further growth, is replaced by the outlook on rebirth¹ as merely renewal of the springs of misery.

Herein they resemble their Christian successors only in a common 'leaving of the world'. As Ernesto Buonaiuti has reminded me, the Christian monks sought, with hope and desire, for what they declared to be plainly, 'a better country, that is, an heavenly',² and so doing, upheld in the Church the spiritual state of well-being, not of body or mind, but of soul. For man's well-doing here the Buddhist monk did admit a happier world hereafter, but a temporal world no less than this, attended no less by 'decay and dying'. The only final goal – but more of that later.

A religion, having as its moving idea the riddance of bodily and mental ills, is good gospel for the work of doctor or social reformer, but as religion, as most of us understand religion, namely, the quest of an ultimate Goal beyond the worlds, it has no fit basis. That riddance, however much, largely in terms of formula, it is harped upon in Buddhist prose and verse (especially in the anthologies of monk and nun), was not the lever and fulcrum in original Buddhism.

¹ An elaborated version of the three deva-messengers (v. p. 52): old age, disease, dying, makes them five, adding a law-court and a *baby*!

² Hebrews xi. 13-16.

I shall be told: but consider the four truths of the First Utterance about Ill – are not these of the original mandate?

I am not the first to say, that this Utterance is perhaps the chief victim of editorial man-handling. This is not to deny, that for me there was any allusion originally made by the Founder's Utterance to life as entailing suffering. True religion is too intimately concerned with a More not to recognize the fact and presence of a Less, a Worse. But Less, Worse, is never for it the central theme. It sees true worth and emphasis in the quest in the Better. In the formula of the code known as the four truths, we have, as another Indian literature recognized at a later date, a doctor's diagnosis: the nature of the complaint, the cause, the complaint as stopped, the means thereto. Positively worded, the end sought is 'being well', yet does the whole formula turn round the fact of 'being ill', and the end is worded only in terms of ill.

One could almost be reconciled to this Indian way of defining by a negative – India has no positive word for 'well' – were it not for the insufferable way in which the very spring in the man, by which the being well is made possible, is looked upon as the cause of his being ill. Thus the second 'truth' runs thus: 'this is the ill-uprising truth: the thirst¹ which is again-becoming-ish, accompanied by delight and passion, taking-delight-in here and there, to wit, the thirst of sense-desire, the thirst of becoming, the

¹ Lit.: 'thirst', translators render it by 'craving'.

thirst of manifold becoming.' Thirst has, for the Christian tradition, been made glorious in aspiration by the Hebrew psalmist. By the Buddhist editor it is used to show the *sole inducer* of the 'ill'. The monk had forsworn so much in life wherein desire, where 'thirst' is the lever of man's efforts, that he forswore also desire. The reader may say: But it is only thirst specifically qualified that is condemned. I reply: I fear it is not so. The word for thirst (nowhere used for bodily thirst in these scriptures) is never applied to any form of desire pronounced good. The two great bogies the monk held in fear were the finding sense gratification lovely and the perpetuation of personal life in this or any world.

It is true that, in the fourth 'truth': the 'means', that is, the 'way' of the diagnosis, the feature: 'right purpose' or 'intent' finds inclusion, but in so far as it is volitional, it comes under condemnation as 'thirst'. And for the rest, it is buried in a category of eight, when it should have been put forward¹ as the very chief thing in the Way: the desire, the will to become well!

'To become well!' – (I would we could say with our neighbours 'to seek "the Well"!') – when will man admit this as the goal of his religious quest? There was a great chance for it to be realized in earliest Buddhism, but the monk arose, in his hand India's proneness for negative expression. And by him the fine positives in Gotama's teaching: *ātmā* as *dhamma*, the Way, and the Aim were crowded out,

¹ Cf. p. 68.

shifted or shrivelled. The worth in the negative appealed to the monk, who had, to so much in life, uttered his 'No, No' (*neti, neti*), and he drew his great creed down to his own narrowed outlook.

As to the description of the Way in those 'four truths' I cannot accept it as the original wording. Let us come to this.

THE WAY IN THE WORLDS

BY THIS TITLE I refer to the so-called 'eightfold path', a formula which, at once for most South Asian Buddhists and for manuals is almost as central as the 'four truths' (indeed of these it is one) and the 'three marks'. I recollect my husband murmuring in his last days: 'The eightfold path: *that* is Buddhism!' Where I differ from this estimate is, not as to its central value – far from it! – it is that I see in the term a bigger thing than is claimed about it.

This difference does not lie in just substituting Way or Road for the not very happy term 'path', a rendering lit upon by pioneer translators, such as Spence Hardy. My chief contention has been to show, that whereas 'way' is of the original message, the epithet 'eightfold' is a later insertion. And that the insertion was made to fill up an unwonted blank caused by the dropping out of an earlier epithet, the value in which had undergone a great worsening. I contend also, that the contents of the term inserted have distracted attention from the real meaning of the original figure: 'way'. Let us look into this.

In the first chapter we saw the Founder emerging from hesitation into decision, inspired by a vision, and by a sight or thought of plants at stages of

growth. We meet him immediately(?) thereafter, explaining his new joy to a passer-by, and then, finding his friends, drafting with or to them a chart of teaching, in which the seeker in religion is shown, not as growing into blossom like a plant, but as a wayfarer choosing the better way.

I have said 'immediately thereafter'. Had we, in the Vinaya records where we read this, a complete account, and not merely more or less serial sketches of the sketchiest kind, we should probably find, that the decision and the going forth to frame and begin the work were not so close in succession as they appear. It is tempting no doubt to link the 'radiant mien' with the inspiring vision, and with the end it brought to anguished doubt. Yet it is scarcely to force a judgement if we hold, that the substitution of the way-figure for that of the stationary-footed plants involved a further pause for thought, and will have brought no less the joy of initiative, when the burden of the vision had been pondered over. There will have been labour-pains in him over the need to show men, that man was no static entity, a never-changing individual, but an ever-becomer – this the plants sufficed to show. But further, there will have been a yearning to show men, that man's life was a bigger thing than just one span here followed by what utterly vague surmise added in supplement; that it was a ranging as man of not one world only, but of many worlds many times in a long, long quest for the ultimate Way's End.

That the other, the more stationary figure of

growth did not become banished from his subsequent teaching is attested by the Sayings. For instance, there is the Sutta 'Becoming', in which, replying to his cousin's question as to just what was meant by 'Becoming' (*bhava*), Gotama speaks of man, his actions and his growth in the worlds, as 'a seed, having action as its field, rain or moisture as will or desire, and renewal in one of the three worlds as result of growth'. No word of positive depreciation is added, yet the monk-editors have contrived to give the terms used an implicit depreciating. Translators by using, for *viññāṇa*, i.e. the man-as-surviving, the later term 'consciousness' or the like, have helped to obscure. The monk-editor has called will or desire by the bad name of thirst or craving. And so this little discourse, a cameo of a gospel of hope, is twisted into one of suggested ways for stopping further 'becoming'. Thus: 'If there were no world of desire and no maturing action, would there be a corresponding becoming?' 'Surely not, sir,' replies the compliant Ānanda. Verily it were worth almost all the Pīṭakas put together, could we in exchange learn the originally spoken terms of this dialogue!¹

Cannot Buddhists and manual-writers begin to see here, as they never yet have seen, what a contrast there is between this talking of the stopping of growth, of becoming, and the hope, the faith in growth, in becoming that we saw the Founder had in him at the vision of the lotuses?

¹ *Anguttara*, i. 223.

Reading with care and imaginative sympathy we may see the Founder, as by nature a man of the road, a lover of travel, out for adventure, seeking what he might win, bringing this feature into his message for his fellows. From merchant-adventurers, coming to remote Kapilavatthu he will have heard tell of other regions. Two come into the legend helping him when he too was afoot. And tradition named him and helpers like him, yes, and disciples too, 'leaders of the caravan'.¹ Buddhists might later have done justice to this trait in their leader, had they not had it obscured for them, by monkish editing; had they not seen in his adventure in search of 'profit' (*attha*) a 'great renunciation of the world'; had they not superimposed on this live wire of humanity their monkish ideal of a calmed quiescent sitter, so too well known in the later sitting Buddha-rūpa.

His own idiosyncrasy, his conception of man as a seeker, and in seeking choosing – here was enough to make him substitute, for the relatively stationary plant-evolution, a better figure. And a figure that less suggested the involuntary. His wayfarer was evidently not a mere drifter, one in a herd of sheep or kine, or in a marshalled band of men under orders. He was out to get somewhere by his own choice of what was for him a better. And be it remembered, this choice in matters of religious reference was, in that day and culture, little left to the man among men. He was at every turn prescribed for.

¹ *Digha*, ii. 39; *Apadāna*, 80, &c.

Way or road was not a new figure for man's travelling in religious teaching, nor a new belief. But in the Vedic *yāna* and the Upanishadic *pañthā*, we do not get suggestion of this choice, this will, put into action, nor yet that this voluntarism was man's essential nature. And more: there was in them no respect paid to the aspect of travel as a wayfaring of man with men. Normal life is not a matter of solitary penetrating through a jungle, a fact which makes translation by 'path' so much less apt than words such as way and road. Here, not the monk-editor, but the translator is to blame. *Magga*, Sansk.: *marga*, is no footpath; it is the Road. And in a road the fellow-wayfarer, as we well know, is a matter of concern for each man. In spite of the monk and of the jungle path (from which in India his kind may be said to have sprung), man's relation to the other man was given, in early Buddhism, a move forward in significance, even though mankind had to wait another five hundred years for the greater urge herein, that is, in what we may call road-sense, that came through Jesus.

Where the monk-editor did offend herein, is that, although the doctrine of the Road came down through Buddhism as *magga*, it was held for some reason good, in the Utterance, to use the narrower term *pañipadā*, a word more suggestive of step-by-step training, than the wayfaring stride.

Mainly, I judge, we should bear in mind, over the way-figure, first, that it symbolizes man as in a More,

a getting on and on; secondly, that it is a faring from world to world, and thirdly, that as wayfarer, he has before him a Way's End. Way, road: these mean will at work, mean progress, growing fitness and at last Goal.

Why then the 'eightfold' epithet? Venerable document as the First Utterance is, revered as it nominally is, there is perhaps no other ancient saying in the scripture so edited as this lets appear. Handed down as it will have been at ever-increasing new 'settlements', through different minds and mouths (oral only), there will inevitably have come in a change here, an addition there, a new term somewhere else. The work of general revision (still mainly oral), such as is recorded to have taken place at Patna some three hundred years later, must have called for a great sifting among the varying repeatings come in from those settlements, a sifting carried out by men whose values in their religion had undergone much change, change resulting from complete severance from Brahmin teaching, from growth of monastic ideals, from the psychological influence of early Sāṅkhya or Analysis of mind.

These revisers will have found, in the various versions, terms they had come to use in (1) a changed way, or (2) with lowered value. Notable among these would be the term once used for aim or profit: *attha*, but later used for 'meaning'; and another word: *bhava* or becoming. Of the former more presently. As to the latter: it is unlikely that the Founder, so soon after being inspired to help man to

'become', as opposed to 'decline', should omit all mention of becoming in his chart of teaching. I believe *mention was there*.

There was in India an old and fit symbol for progress: the wheel (*chakka*). The king's chariot-wheel went forth to conquer. So, it was taught, the helper of men set a-rolling the wheel of *dhamma*, of the Ideal, the Ought to be, or (as we might say) of religion. In later Buddhism we find the compound *bhava-chakka*: wheel of becoming. It might equally well have been *bhava-magga*, since *magga* as symbol ranked then even higher than *chakka*. But, through the growth of monastic pessimism about life, the fact of life as a coming to be, was greatly disvalued. No 'way' that involved *this* could be honoured. And, as I have said, the word *bhava* was used for concrete becomings: lives, worlds. Hence, if, in the original First Utterance, and surviving in some versions of it, the Way was called, not 'wheel of becoming', but 'road of becoming', it may well be that the ecclesiastical centre at Patna judged well to drop, from their Revised Version, the epithet *bhava-* (becoming) from *magga*.

But to maintain the traditional form, it would be necessary to insert another epithet.

It is possible that the matter was for a time in suspense. There were then several numbered lists of desirable things for learning and practising. Among them was one of eight good ways of deed, word and thought, known as the eight rightnesses or fitnesses (*sammatta*). And we have the group of Suttas called

'the Three Courses,'¹ showing each one of those lists *being*, as it were, *tried on* to express the Third, or Middle Way. In the end the list of eight won, perhaps as 'fit' for both laity and monk. Such is my reasoned conviction about this great figure, now having prefixed to it, not what it most essentially stood for – man as becoming, ever wayfaring in the worlds – but the sort of conduct that becoming a More would certainly imply.

The eight are, as qualities of the good life, irreproachable if inadequate. They are right (or fit) views, purpose, endeavour, speech, action, liveliness, mindfulness and concentration. In that two of them bring forward modes of will they worthily represent the old teaching. In fact, Mr. A. J. Edmunds has come across Chinese reference to the Way, in which this is referred to as just the Way of Purpose, without the other seven. I am ignorant of the precise Chinese word, but we have it translated, I am told, into Sanskrit as *saṃkalpa*: purpose. That neither 'wisdom' nor 'amity' should raise the number to ten is curious; when the number is so raised, as is the case in the Tens of the Fourth Collection (the Way finds no mention under the Eights), the added two are 'knowledge' and 'deliverance'.

Where the eight properties have done serious harm to the religious value in Buddhism is, that in being dragged in, they as a Less have blocked out something greater. They have served as a red herring

¹ *Paṭipadā*; see above, p. 65. *Anguttara*, i, p. 295 f.

diverting attention from the true symbolism of the Road and the Roadman. The Road was chosen as pointing man to a journey, not of the good life here only, but of life of the man, each man, seen whole, immensely more than just this short span. And study of the 'parts' has distracted attention from the Wayfarer, so much so, that we find in later exegesis complacent lines declaring there is a Road but no Goer.¹

How different is this preoccupation with the eight parts from such a clearly older Sutta as that which shows the Road as lifting from mother or from son the fear, that old age, illness, death may part them one from the other. Certainly the good life detailed in the eight parts would conduce to nearness here and hereafter. But it is the fact and order of life as way and wayfaring, not here only, that is here the base of faith and hope in meeting again. In the Sutta the odd little slip of the inserting editor: not the usual 'Just this eightfold way . . .' but 'Just this way, eightfold way . . .' cries out to us to note what in the past has been done to it.²

Once a great symbol of man's life through the worlds, and not just the ethical rune as which it is usually valued, the Way has now lost for Buddhists and for us its true meaning. If we cut out the shackling 'eight parts', and listen to scriptural testimony to it as so freed, how does it not shine in new light! It was the Way, not as eightfold, but just 'Way', which Ānanda, his leader gone, declares as that

¹ *Visuddhi-Magga*, ch. xvi.

² *Anguttara*, i, p. 178 f.

which he had bequeathed to his followers, a somewhat not before revealed. It was the Way, not as eightfold, but as 'leading to joy', whereof the poet of the Going-Beyond Section in the old anthology sang:

He who would practise as the Teacher taught,
'Tis he may go from hence to the Beyond.
Yea, hence to the Beyond 'tis he may go,
Making the Way Incomparable to become;
The Way this is for leading to Beyond,
And therefore is it Yonder-faring called;

and the poet Migajāla too (when forgetting to call it eightfold, or not knowing it as such):

Yea, to the mighty Haven doth it wend,
(Holy) the faring, well (for thee) the End.

It is just Way (*magga*) that is the title of the great section in the third Nikāya, not 'eightfold way'. And in this patchwork literature it is significant, that only in a Commentary do we meet with the compound 'course of growth', a good equivalent for 'way of becoming'.¹

¹ Majjhima Commentary: *vaḍḍhanaka-paṭiṭṭhāna*.

WHICH WAS THE QUEST?

THE NEXT DIFFICULTY, in the old records-patchwork, for which I have sought a solution lay in another episode, also in the Vinaya sketches of the start of the Gotama-mission. I refer to the coming in of the two men, both Brahmin students of high promise, destined to be held in veneration as the chief pair (*agga-yuga*) of disciples: Sāriputta and Moggallāna. In approaching the Founder as pupils seeking a teacher they are said to have had a quest. In response to what they seek, the answer they are stated to have got does not refer in the least to that quest, but to something totally different. And this has forced me to conclude that we have here two different quests, two different teachers, and that the ancient memoirs of what actually happened have become intermingled. I do not find that the misfit in inquiry and response has led either Buddhists or scholars to such a conclusion. It does not appear to have raised the thought, that were we to find such a misfit in a similar interview to-day, we should conclude at once that some reporter, some witness, had got his notes confused. But the result of the confusion has been, that while the reported quest has been stifled, the reported answer has been given a relatively undeserved immortality.

Simply put, the inquiry will have been whether Gotama could teach the two Brahmins what he thought about the Brahmin teaching of *amrita*, Pali, *amata*: literally 'the not dead', i.e. immortality. Actually they find Assaji, one of the first disciples, radiant in mien, and ask the cause. Assaji answers, that he has a teacher who has a religion of explaining things causally. Thereupon insight comes to Sāriputta as to what (in religion) the stopping of the cause could bring about; he fetches his friend and they become Gotama's devoted adherents.

'The immortal', or man's condition hereafter is a religious matter which places us at once in the times when the early Upanishadic teachings were to the fore. We have but to open their pages, nor look long: 'man, at dissolution of the body passes into breath . . . into the wind which is space . . . goes where are these devas; reaching that he becomes immortal as are they. . . .' And so on, verily a vague and windy teaching. To get clearer knowledge men were consulting such as had psychic gifts; Moggallāna had much in that nature to develop; Gotama was (at least later) known to have such; there is for me every probability that those two Brahmins sought him for such knowledge.

But what of Assaji's answer to men bent on such a quest?

This was about, not a well established, if vaguely formulated teaching, but a relatively new subject then much 'in the air': the causal uniformities not, I believe, in 'Nature', but in the inner world of mind.

That this mental world proceeded no less uniformly than bodily processes: this was a necessary feature in the new and rising study of treating mind analytically, later to be called Sāṅkhya, or computation, a word serving for analysis in general and for the new 'psychology' in particular. We saw, in Gotama's hesitation, how he had been drawn to make a gospel out of this new preoccupation with (mental) cause and effect. We saw how the deva of his vision passed it by, as well as the monastic ideal that had no less suggested itself: also a new thing 'in the air'.

We do not find, in the first utterances, that Gotama regretted his judgement, that men in general would not be benefited by a teaching as gospel one or both of these subjects. I would not go so far as to say, he did not, in his message of man's growth as wayfaring from the 'as you are' to the goal of 'as you may become', apply causal uniformity as strengthening his teaching. I believe we even find him 'trying on' the principle of causation to an interlocutor. Put all that aside, he is reported saying, I will teach you religion:—Given this, that comes to be; if this happens, that will happen; and the same negatively put. But the man does not hear it gladly; says bluntly, I don't know what you're talking about. It had for him no appeal.

Yet we hear Buddhists occasionally saying, their creed is 'based' on causation. Had this been so, we should surely have met with it in the first utterances. We do not. The four 'truths' take causation for granted; so do we when we pour water on a blaze to

extinguish it. They do not make it the subject of teaching, to be by each man applied in seeking salvation. Nor, in the tree-legend, where an applied formula of causation in terms of the origin of 'ill' is made to be the subject of the Founder's musing, is the *fact* of causation or its possible *usefulness* in religious teaching shown as that subject. The formula is, so to speak, hung like a garland round his neck, or like the beads of a rosary passed through his fingers with mutterings. It is depicted as something already made. When, shortly after, he is shown hesitating whether to make a gospel of it, causal uniformity is worded more generally, more intelligently.

If then Gotama was really approached about immortality, but has had the praise of another man's teaching thrust into his disciple's mouth, who was the other man? This there is nothing definite in the scripture to tell us. He is not the only mouth-piece of a new movement who has for posterity remained nameless. As to that, what man was it, or what woman who started Madonna-worship? Or who turned Vedic teaching round to be changed into Immanence? I have made surmise elsewhere who it may have been. In early Buddhism causation came in somehow, to stay. It might have been a lever of value in the original teaching of 'becoming'. The winning to a better in becoming gets endorsement when shown as a process of effect from cause. In the working of the cause we pass from a so-much to a more. As a fact it was not the useful factor it

might have been. Pessimism of monk stepped into lend chief importance to the prevention of effect by arresting the cause. And the effect of the cause is, in formula, shown to be a series of links in the up-rising, not of the better, the more, the higher, the more well, but of the worse, namely of 'ill'.¹

We have only to look more closely into the half-buried picture of the New Word brought into the Indian world of five to six hundred years B.C. to discern, that the faith in, the outlook on immortality was something to move men as causation was not. I have pointed to the closing utterance of that New Word as messenger in the charge about 'becoming the Peak of the Immortal'. And in the opening episodes it is a telling, a seeking of the Immortal that peeps out in the pages.

The seeking, the finding, the becoming the Undying is, I have shown, in the early Upanishads almost a commonplace in both prose and verse. And now in the New Gospel it is *the Many* who are called upon to share with the student:

Open to them the doors of the Undying,
They hearing let them send out faith!

I go to turn the Dhamma-wheel in Kāsi's city;
In world grown blind I'll beat the drum of the Immortal!

Why is the world of the Buddhist, ay, and the world of us who read, who translate, gone so blind?²

¹ One Sutta only is a notable exception. See *Samyutta*, ii, p. 29 f.: 'Causal Association.'

² In the first line the English translator has substituted Nirvana for 'Undying'!

Have we not here a figure akin to that of the Psalmist, when he sang of a city's gates as everlasting?

'Lift up your heads ye everlasting gates and the king of glory shall come in!'

For the man at the Goal, everlasting is undying, is immortal. And the worth herein shows what was meant by Way and Way's End. What a tragedy it is that the great word 'life' should have come to be so tied down to body and mind, that its worth as 'the going on towards' should in the word meaning this: the word *samsāra*, have been held up in horror, and the word of making to go on: 'cause', should have come to be valued only as a way of making something stop (*nirodha*)! When shall we see Buddhism fall into line with the great dramatist:

'Then, heaven, set ope thy everlasting gates?'

THE AIM; THE GOAL

I DO NOT FIND that it is sufficiently realized how much, in the Upanishadic turn-over of the outlook in religion, the concept of man as a seeker is newly brought forward; that in religion man was on a quest, was looking for something, was urged to look for it as of great importance, vital, intimate importance, a something other than his earthly everyday quests. 'This it is that should be inquired after, that should be searched after . . . tell me, speak to me about That' – such refrains we meet with in the new religious teaching dating from, I believe, not more than about 700 B.C., not the remoter date many prefer.

Of course this aspect of religion, this very ancient aspect, does not belong to India only. The Hebrews knew it well: 'O that I knew where I might find him, that I might even come before his presence . . . As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God!' The Christian also: 'Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts have no rest save in thee.' With the wonderful meeting, too, of Western and Eastern aspiration that is in the Apocalypse, where the seeking is taught as mutual, and That who is to be sought is to be found, not by

going without, but by going within: 'Behold! I stand at the door and knock. If any man will hear my voice and will open unto me, I will come in.' The Sought is here. The man has to open the door. No, our painter is reported to have said, I painted no handle on the weed-overgrown door. Only the man inside can open it. It's up to him to will to let in That Whom he is seeking.

Here, we might say, we have Upanishadic and original Buddhist teaching combined: the seeking what is to be found within, once there be the choice, the will, to go the right way to find. I have shown above a restatement of the start made by the Sakyan missioners of the seeking, and what was to be sought; how too the seeking was to be carried on as bridging the interval between seeker and sought by ever becoming, by ever 'making-become', less unlike the perfection sought. As an Englishman wrote not long ago, not knowing perhaps how he was echoing the original Buddhist aim: 'It is all-important that we should remember, that our perfection lies in developing what we are.'¹

With this matter of the quest in the great Between made foremost, *a good word became wanted* for man's aim, man's goal. And those first missioners lifted up such a word to this very high meaning. What was the word? Most Buddhists and writers would reply: Nirvana. Did not this mean some sort of endless unspeakable bliss, when man as man is fit, at his last death, to go out like a candle: not necessarily as

¹ Canon Newbolt: *Priestly Blemishes*, p. 153.

annihilated, but no more as man tied up in the limitations of birth and death?

I have ventured to maintain this word *nirvana* was not *so used* by the first missionaries. Such an idea would not have at all appealed to the Everyman they set out to teach. But they had, for purposes of daily life, a word meaning both what a man wants and also what he seeks. And they appear to have taken over this word into their teaching as the chief thing in life, in religion, to be sought. This was the word *artha*, or *attha*: thing needed, thing sought. It may be rendered rightly as four of our words: aim, gain, profit, goal. It is used as just object in an undertaking, or process, e.g. of the senses; or else as subject or matter of discourse. When, in the Sakyan mission, it is used in the sense of Aim, the word appears to have acquired the importance of a religious technical term, as the spiritual 'gain' to be spiritually aimed at. It is found either unqualified, or with the epithet: *samparāyika*: 'belonging to the beyond, or to other worlds'.

Thus Bimbisāra king of Magadha, having conferred with village headmen on subjects (*attha*) 'concerning this life',¹ bids them go to listen to the 'Blessed One' on the subject of the other worlds: *attho samparāyiko*. Young converts who have attained the true learning (*aññā*) are said, in professing faith, to declare '*attha*', and not to bring in '*attā*' – as if in clumsy word-play.

In the First Utterance, the middle way, and not

¹ Lit.: 'concerning the seen-thing' (the usual idiom).

the two side-issues mentioned, is said to make for *attha*. Here I must anticipate protest.

I may remind readers to whom that First Utterance is unfamiliar, that choice of way, in the religious quest, is there said to lie between the under-regulating and the over-regulating of one's life, between free play given to will and ascetic restriction. These two 'side-issues' are there said 'not to conduce to the aim'. When we come to the middle way (combining implicitly both play of will and regulating thereof), it is not said, as we might expect, to conduce to the Aim. *The word 'Aim' has been left out.* Instead, we find four terms as the goal: enlightenment, higher (i.e. psychic) knowledge, calm and nirvana; find them just where we should expect to see *attha* mentioned.

For me there is here seen the hand (or mouth) of the revising editor. *Attha*, always, as we saw, ambiguous, came in time to be used invariably for the *meaning* of a saying as contrasted with the 'letter' of it. Again, it was becoming, in the nascent Brahmin culture, a technical term for affairs, business, the secular matters of Bimbisāra's speech. Such a usage gives the title to one of the earliest secular books of Indian literature, the Arthashāstra.¹ And the thematic lines at the opening of the epic of doubtful date: the Mahābhārata, speak, in what is an editorial 'frill' of man's life, as there handled, as threefold: *dharma*, his duties, *artha*, his business, *mōksha*, his salvation.

¹ Said to have been composed by a minister of Asoka's father, it was probably only *put into writing* many generations later.

In the 'revised', the 'authentic' version of the First Utterance, it had evidently become advisable, to eliminate *attha*, at least in its positive, if not in its negative form, and to substitute something else: something which had conversely become, not less, but more highly valued, and was not ambiguous.

A converse case is the spiritual meaning of 'awakening', not as just the bodily awaking from sleep, which we see emerging in the early Upanishads, while the abstract form *bôdhi*, *sambôdhi* appears only in later numbers. This: *sambôdhi*, is the first of the four substitutes for *attha*.

The second of the four is 'higher knowledge': *abhi-ññā*, the name given, when we know not, to a group of formulas describing psychic gifts. The third: 'calm' (*upasamā*) is an ideal appealing to monasticism. The fourth and last is the to us more familiar word nirvana (*nibbāna*).

Nibbāna, a word of doubtful derivation, but meaning, in its pre-*summum bonum* use, the bringing something to an end, e.g. the putting out of fire, the getting out of a bog or a jungle, the getting past inexperienced skill – all Pīṭakan usages – is found in the Third Collection definitely defined, not as goal, but as preparation for attaining, namely, as the waning (*khaya-*) of lust, hate and muddledness. Equally is it found used as *summum bonum*. But it is fairly evident, that the former meaning is the earlier wording, since, once the word came to be used for the religious goal, it would not be any longer used for anything less. Save only perhaps by way of derived metaphor, as

when we say 'heavenly' for any supreme pleasure of earth. It is indeed historically fortunate that this definition of nirvana has been among our 'left-ins'. I can remember the mild sensation caused fifty years ago, when the context first became known, and when thoughtful readers were more interested in the discovery of Buddhism than they are now.

Those four substitutes in the First Utterance for *attha* are not really Goal-terms; they are each a word for training in *making for a Goal*. In time the last of the four attained the value which for the first Buddhists lay rather in the term *param'attha*: supreme aim:

Stirring up energy to win the goal supreme.¹

Let it be here never forgotten, that the message of the first Buddhists was, not for the monk as such, nor for the academic sophist; it was for the 'many-folk' (*bahu-jana*). Now in a folk-gospel we should expect to find its quest something which was (1) the man seeking to attain, and finally attaining his welfare *as man*; not a welfare without the man; the man must be in it; (2) a quest which is positive, not negative; (3) a quest which is not something as yet inconceivable by man; something he can think of as at least More than anything he yet knows. But in nirvana we have neither (1), nor (2), nor (3). It is an end without the man in it; it is negative; it prejudges the as yet inconceivable.

Let us see how far the older term *attha* served

¹ *Sutta-Nipāta*, p. 68.

better for a folk-gospel. *Attha* is essentially object with man in it and of it, of *atthiko*, the seeker. The man is both seeker and valuer of what he seeks. *Attha* is positive; something to be sought, not something that is a Not. And it is something which – to use another term for nirvana – is not so 'void' that it cannot be valued and ever re-valued.

If I have used for it the word 'goal', I have not always a final goal in sight. The *gaule* or pole in a race may serve to point out, not the end, but only the end of a lap in the course; the runner's next objective. And this indeed is what, with our human limitations, *the end must actually mean*. To shift the phrase, it is just the Best, the Most that we, in our Better, our More ahead, can as yet conceive. Herein the wisdom, the reticence of the founder of Buddhism is akin to the thought of Jesus: 'To-day thou shalt be with me – in paradise.' 'In my Father's house are many – mansions': *monai*, stopping-places: homes as it were of the schoolboy of to-day who knows his family may have moved to another 'home' next holidays. Here is no finality taught. As in the Cana feast 'the best is yet to come'.

Yes, to come; not for ever just the More. Man did not agree, in wording his comparing values, that the 'more' was all. His superlative 'most' has ever been for him no less true, even if, perhaps, implied only in the more.

What then as a More only, with Most implicit, was the Sakyan *attha*? We read of a Brahmin asking Gotama: 'Is there any one thing which compasses

and establishes both kinds of *attha*: that of this life and that of life hereafter?' 'There is.' 'What is it?' 'Earnestness (lit.: the not being slack). Make this become, and you will get both *attha*'s.' In what did this earnestness consist? So to live here as to become more fit for the companionship,¹ not yet of the Highest, but of those who have gone to a worthier world, the lap in the long way to consummation they have yet attained.

¹ *Digha-Nikāya*, Sta. xiii.

JHĀNA AS I SEE IT

THE EARTH is as if musing, the firmament, the sky, water, the mountain, as it were, muses . . .' in this way does the definition open, in the ancient Upanishads, when the mental attitude called *dhyāna*, Pali, *jhāna*, is considered. We have, in no European tongue known to me, a fit word for the Indian term. If I use 'musing', it is only because that is less a misfit than such words connoting intellectual activity as are 'reflection' or 'meditation'. The German translation has used *sinnen* in translations of these, but only to throw it aside where it failed to fit.¹ Nor is blame conveyed herewith to the translator, since, as I have elsewhere shown, the Indian use of the term is indecisive. For me, with Pitaka evidence in view, we have to get rid of the Western notion, that the still, silent man, in what we like to call 'meditation', is turning over some object in intellectual activity. Whether or not we have, when alone with 'Nature', seemed to sense a silent reserved expectancy in hill and lake and drifting cloud, it is, for one not bound in by formulas, true of the cult of *jhāna*, so prevalent in the Suttas, that we are, in it, up against, not

¹ The Böhlingk and Roth Dictionary has *Nachsinnen*, *Vertiefung*, *Anschaung*. Dr. Heiler used *Versenkung*.

introversive absorption, but rather an attitude of the watcher who has made his mind a *tabula rasa* and is *waiting to learn*. The man-in-*jhāna* is better described as a child Samuel – ‘Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth’ – than as a rapt yogi.

Now this is where I part company with the more yoga-ish view of the manuals. My restatement is based, partly on the *jhāna* formula itself, partly on passages in Sutta and exegesis, which leave me in no doubt. The formula, worded in four stages (split later into five) directs that the sitting devotee (a) divest the mind of all distraction through thinking about this or that (*vitakka*), or pondering thereon; (b) divest the mind of anything affecting him emotionally; (c) divest the mind yet more thoroughly hereof; (d) with the result that he will enter on a state of ‘mindfulness’ or mental alertness (*sati*), and indifference (*upekkhā*). This serene alertness is all; so far as the formula goes. The practiser is now in no sort of drugged or muzzy state, of trance, coma or ecstasy, nor is he absorbed in ‘thought’. And there we are left.

But let the reader consider what, in several contexts, supervenes. Most frequently there follow, with no explicit indication of induced effect, a list of five modes of ‘psychic’ consciousness (*abhiññā*). These are called *iddhi*, or modes of achievement by superwill (levitation, &c.), deva-hearing or clairaudience, thought-reading, memory of past lives, and deva-sight or clairvoyance; to which a later non-psychic sixth of a religio-ethical kind was at some time

appended. It is to my judgement fairly clear, that the preparation required by the formula was, as motorists say, to 'dip' the normal light of the presentations of earth-consciousness, and so permit access of the other, the psychic body's presentations.

Thus elsewhere we read, that here below one can gain 'entire happiness' when, in fourth *jhāna*, one can beware of the presence of devas, and dwell in converse with them. Again, that deva-access is gained by *jhāna*. Again, that when a man makes to become a way for access to the Brahma- (or super-deva-) world, he practises *jhāna*. Once more, Moggallāna, a chief disciple among the founders, is said to enter *jhāna*, that he may get into touch with the next world, and so be able to report what he finds has been the happy fate of individuals who were worthy on earth, for the encouragement of men here below.

So far I have found writers on *jhāna* entirely ignoring this and other Pīṭakan evidence and, in consequence, passing over that habit of converse with other worlds which in original Buddhism is so present and so real here and now. Or else they see in *jhāna* that which many would call 'mystic' experience. For me (I repeat) early Buddhism may be rated as 'mystical' or not; or it may be rated as akin to Yoga (of which it shows no awareness¹) or not. But its early 'musing' or 'psychic cognizance' cannot rightly be identified with the outlook in either.

¹ The two or three sporadic Suttas on breathing exercises do not mention Yoga.

Jhāna was less obscure than that of the mystic, and was not the inward attitude of the yogī. In its broadest, its most real, because for us its most practical meaning, mysticism is usually spoken of as converse, usually solitary, with the unseen, or other-worldly. Now converse is access – is comm-union, not union. In it attention is really turned outwards. And when, if ever, the earth comes to accept this humbler, more practicable aspect of mysticism, instead of using terms of an as yet inconceivable union with an as yet inconceivable Highest, we may then come to hold in wider worth a mysticism that is not only attainable by a saintly aspirant now here, now there, but one that is a way for the help of the many, if only it be that they 'are willing to learn'.

European writers for the most part and Buddhists show but little interest in *jhāna*, prominent feature though it be in the Suttas and anthologies, save when writers are forcing a false alliance between it and Yoga. They fail to see it as the link between the first Buddhists and the unseen worlds, of the Here-after, as of the Before. They were or are possibly themselves too uninterested in the Unseen to care to see how near those first Buddhists lived to it, calling their leader a 'remover of the veil'. We shall never get a true picture of them so long as we take up this alien unsympathetic attitude, an attitude that we in our own case can so ill afford to maintain. It is only in part herein, in part through ignorance of their scripture, that I can explain the acquiescence, in Buddhist utterances, in their Founder as having been

a teacher in this life's welfare only, and their ignoring of his frequently recorded converse with men of other worlds. Or that I can explain the curious theory they have formed, that our actions (*karma*) here so far supersede the doer of them, that '*karma*' becomes an entity automatically resulting in a new creature or complex, in a world of other such complexes, where there exists apparently no intelligent communal procedure assigning him weal or woe.

That their scripture, in two of the Collections, definitely brings every man, just after leaving earth, before a tribunal of fellowmen, the judges being called Yama's, no less clearly than does the old Persian creed, or the Christian and Muslim scriptures (with a less definite date) I have found, not only unknown to professing Buddhists, but even ridiculed! (I hasten to say that the ignorant mocker is an English 'vert.) In their own scriptures there is twice recorded what is at once a query on and a protest against the irresponsibility of this dummy man called '*kamma*' (or *karma*): 'If deeds are done without a doer, that is, a self, who is it that experiences the results of them?' In other words, are we in the hereafter merely automatic robots, or is it you and I who will there find recompense? The Founder – alas! the shame of it – is made to reply to this 'foolish' (?) questioner merely in terms of code, of formula.

Had the catechism in which this irruption occurs been of the genuine old rock, we should surely have had the Founder referring the questioner to the post mortem tribunal, alleged to have been his own

teaching. But in place of that we see the canker of the not-self spreading already over the Suttas.

That the Founder was himself psychically advanced is so clear in the scripture, that when, if ever, Buddhists learn to know their Suttas, they can hardly avoid testifying to the changed outlook it will provoke. We read that men would flock to him to learn of the fate of those gone before, and find in him one who claimed to know. This knowledge would *now* be vaguely set down to an omniscience, which another Sutta makes him explicitly repudiate. But further, we have a valuable 'left-in', testifying to the Founder's own estimate of such an outlook on the unseen. We find him, namely, asking disciples of his kith and kin, whether, in ever striving in the godly life for something even better than they had yet won, they did not find joy in so doing? They did, is the reply. Now why, he goes on, do you suppose I have told you, as to this or that disciple whom death has taken, what has been his fate? 'Did you think I wanted to advertise my powers, or to impose upon you, or talk you over? I did not want that. But there are young men who, believing, are uplifted in knowledge and joy, and hearing this, concentrate the mind on such a state. For them that makes long for good and for happiness.'¹

The Founder, helper of men, was able and willing to converse with friends beyond the veil. The friends were equally able and willing to respond, yea, to seek him and in turn to question. And in him the

¹ *Majjhima*, 'Nālakapāna Sutta'.

result was added vision into life as a whole, into knowledge of our next step, into man's birthright of ranging the worlds. He might *know* as did few, but the ranging was for every man and woman. Why then in the name of heaven and of hope should these things be accounted superstition, to be swept aside, as not of the things he held both near and dear?

WAYS OF DIVINE LIVING

I NOW COME to a teaching both lovely and impressive, about which I part company from Buddhists and books. It is held to be of the original gospel. I hold that it was not. I see it as imported probably during the life, the long life of the Founder, and as a persistently honoured guest. But always as guest. Its omission from lists of leading formulas stamps it perhaps as that. Evidence of its forming the cult of a separate body led by a Brahmin of forgotten name, is slight, but it is strongly contributive. This I have shown elsewhere.

The name of it, which I have rather freely rendered 'abidings' and 'moods', is literally 'dwellings'. We should now use the word 'living'. Indian tongues were unable to say with us, as in Macbeth: 'How will you *live*? As birds do, mother.' 'Dwell' would be used, yet is the emphasis, in the formula, not so much local, as vital, spiritual. Hence I would now say, for *viharatha*, 'live ye as they who have the self as lamp . . .', not 'dwell ye'.

But in the matter of origin no one as yet seems to be of my way of thinking. Some day others will go through the evidence and see for themselves, how early Buddhists, much as they valued the teaching

(possibly brought into their 'order' by disciples bereft of their Brahmin teacher), have adjusted it too clumsily to their body of doctrine to leave doubt about its exoteric origin.

Further restatement in this very notable uplift in ethics I have made in four ways:

(1) I have reminded readers that, whereas the (later) institutional formula of the four ways of divine living has been taken to mean just so many modes of benevolent sentiment in meditation, it was, as practised in a more genuine way, and told in detail in the much later book *Path of Purity*, a telepathic set of efforts to transmit amity, pity, sympathetic joy, poise (taken separately) by a person to an unseen person, found to be lacking in one or the other. Transmitted just as sincerely as if the transmitter had sent him a verbal message, or, in later days, a written letter. This has curiously got lost from the Piṭakas. I only find it hinted, in a context, where the transmitter, with a personal or multipersonal unit in mind, is said to rise thence to the universal sweep of the formula, embracing the quarters of the earth (it may be, or it should be, of the worlds).

(2) I have preferred to call this not telepathy, but televolution. The formula reveals the pitiful need of the Indian language for a word equal to our will. It uses the phrase 'pervades with thought accompanied by amity', and the rest. It makes good laudably with the vivid word 'suffuses' (or irradiates: *pharati*).

(3) Exegesis only fails, when doing full justice to the practice as a transfusion, by breaking down over

the fourth: 'poise' (*upekkhā*, or indifference, or equanimity), reserving this for the transmitter or willer, as if, after his orgy of altruism or philanthropy, he needed to suffuse himself with recovered balance! (He wrote as a monk for monks.) The contexts give no ground for this reservation, and besides, the unbalanced person is obviously in need of friendly aid not less than is the person poor in amity or the rest.

(4) It is somewhat strange to find these four ways, so appreciated in the Suttas when reference is made to them, so neglected to all appearance as a religious practice by leading teachers. The only case known to me of suffusing an indifferent man with amity, so that he, responding to the power of will becomes a loving follower, is that of Roja of Kusinārā.¹ Ānanda the devoted attendant brought this about, yet we never read of Ānanda himself exercising the divine ways. It is very possible that the silence of the two chief disciples about it is due to their decease having taken place *before the teaching became adopted*. Sāriputta is found discussing its followers with his leader, but this Sutta may have been fathered on both of them unduly.

But further, the monks and nuns of the Anthologies make no mention of the four ways of Brahma-living. The monks speak of being 'void of enmity', which takes us but a little way. Nor do Revāta's fine lines get beyond praise of amity as a sentiment, which he 'makes become' (an equivalent of 'suffuse'). And

¹ *Vinaya*, Mhv. vi. 36.

in the lists¹ of what we may call prize-men-and-women in this or that virtue or gift, the nearest approach to the four is to name one monk and one lay woman as 'best in living in unlimited un-enmity'. The nuns to a great extent sing about their 'emancipation' (not always *religious* liberty), or about their recovery from the miseries of bereavement. There is scarcely a word, save in one woman-teacher and comforter, showing they felt, they could best vindicate their breaking of narrower ties by the broader sisterhood and motherhood to be practised in the 'ways of divine living'.

Two of the canonical anthologies do refer to the four, or at least to the first of them: the Suttanipāṭa and the Little Text. Ignorant it would seem of the occurrence in the former work, even Buddhists know and often quote the concluding poem of the latter:

As mother her own child lifelong,
her only child would warding be,
so let him also make become
the mind immeasurable,
Ay, amity for all the world . . .

For myself I incline to the belief, that we have here a metrical legacy of the disciples of that unknown Brahmin teacher, the poem ending with the words:

Whether he stand, walk, sit, or lie,
let him this inner wareness keep:
GOD have they here this living called.²

¹ *Anguttara-Nikāya*, i. 13 f.

² *Khuddakapāṭha*, ix: 'Brahmam etam vihāram āhu.'

It was a really wonderful spiritual ideal, over against which the best of us are but babes. I have never heard of any Buddhist practising it, save as a universal 'sentiment'. I have only met one woman who told me of her exercising 'mettā' when meeting at close quarters with unfriendly attitude. Her success in bringing about a change to amity surprised her humility greatly. But she was not a Buddhist. Will the practice in its original intention as individual televolitional benevolence ever be adopted in the teaching of the world-religions?

GOTAMA OR BUDDHA?

WE OF THIS TRADITION are divided in theory and vocal habit over the two names, 'Jesus', and the (in English only, harsh and strident) monosyllable 'Christ'. There is a parallel in Buddhism. To it I shall come presently. In the Vinaya records of the beginning of the Founder's mission, we find that the yet unknown teacher is accosted by men of his own class, *kshatriyas*, not as *kumāra* (as he in turn addresses them), but as *bhante bhagavā*, which is as if an Englishman said 'my lord teacher'. And more: even before he has uttered to his friends the outline of what he intends to teach, he is recorded forbidding them any longer to be calling him by his name, or 'venerable' (*āvūso*, the way of monk to monk). Thenceforth he was 'worthy one (or saint), wayfarer (*tathāgata*), the rightly enlightened one (*sammā-sambuddha*)'.

Gotama was a worthier man than one to use such terms of himself, and pious editors have evidently got busy here. And yet, if I here speak truly, it is curious, how little 'busy' they appear to have got over those precious scraps of history (they are nothing more) – the records of the First and Second Councils, at Rājagāha and at Vesālī. It is largely from these two scraps that we can infer the growth of the cult

of the Founder as 'Buddha' to be a later phenomenon. Putting aside the account in the Mahāvamsa of Ceylon, as admittedly a work of about A.D. 600, and taking only the centuries-older Vinaya account, we read that this council appears (reasonably enough) to have been held shortly after the death of the venerable Founder, and therefore when the sense of loss, and it may well be, of remorse, was yet keenly felt.

It is the more strange that we find no expression publicly made of any feeling as to the tremendous, if inevitable loss the Order had sustained; no panegyric of its great father; and further, no mention of him as 'Buddha' is made from first to last, much less of 'Sambuddha'. Nor, as to that, is he called either Tathāgata or Sugāta, as is so often the case in the Suttas. Yet further: when the president, Kassāpa, who had wilfully left his aged leader to live apart, questions Upāli and then Ānanda for such evidence as they could best give, as to the First Utterance of each rule and each saying, *there is not even allusion made* to the man, who came to be called the author of every rule and of nearly every saying! When, in the personal inquisition made of the much bullied Ānanda, the Founder is at last mentioned, it is just to be called Bhagavan, a name for any Indian teacher used by the pupil. There are not even incidentally any words of adoring reference. The assembly is shown caring much more about rule and saying, and about Ānanda's shortcomings, and even about the Order's petty economies than about its common loss.

Things are not different at the Second Council placed a century later. Here we should not expect any more a keen sense of loss. But at the council there is again no mention of the word Buddha; there is only Bhagavan; Sugāta once, and allusion to the teacher or master: *Satthar*. Only in verses cited, by way of a 'frill', from the Suttas, does the title 'Buddha, kin of the sun' occur, and a general reference to 'Buddhas' once in the accompanying prose.

I may possibly take too far a leap herefrom, but this is for me evidential, that the Founder was not referred to as 'the Buddha' till after the century following his death. It is no proof to the contrary to say, the term occurs in the Suttas. On the one hand, it is there an epithet for any truly wise man, e.g. a man of such qualities – '*buddha*, in his last body, very wise great man';¹ on the other, we may have the busy insertions of the editor.

But, it may be contested, does he not, in the Sutta following the one just cited,¹ tell a man to *consider him* as 'buddha'?

This is a context, where I venture to read, not *buddha*, but *suddha*. It is this latter word, meaning at once purified, and our religious 'saved', which the context demands; that, and not *buddha*. The Founder, asked by a Brahmin how he expects to 'become', i.e. be reborn, is made to reply: I shall become not X, or Y, or Z, because, just as a lotus gets no smear from contact with water, so I get no smear

¹ *Anguttara-Nikāya*, ii. 35.

from contact with the world in which I live, and therefore am I '*suddha*'. And hence the concluding sentence should say: 'consider me as *suddha*'. No claim is here made for a monopoly; any man or woman could attain the same immunity.

But a reverberation *from the foregoing saying* may have affected, in compilation, this Sutta. A growing Buddha-cult was going on between the fifth and third centuries B.C., the century of the great revision, and it is possible, that to convert *suddha* into *buddha*, and make the Founder ascribe this quality to himself in a special way, may have been judged to be a more edifying mode of teaching, than to observe careful congruity with the context, and to be also a more up-to-date prediction. As to that the compound *śuddha-buddhi* occurs in Sanskrit literature.¹

With the Revision and the Third Council, we are up against the epithet in its fuller form: *sammā-sambuddha*. The test of orthodoxy was using it: 'Was the Sammā-sambuddha an Analyst or not?' That is, did he analyse the man into the 'five groups' of body and mind, into just *dharmas*, fleeting phenomena bodily and mental?

No one to my knowing has as yet made a careful historical study into the growth of the Buddha-cult, in which the very human, very beloved son of the Sakyas zoomed up as a superman, called, in India, *deva beyond devas*,² in East Asia, Deity Itself. It is one

¹ Art. in Böthlingk and Roth Dictionary.

² *The Milinda Questions* (1930), 109.

of difficulty, partly for lack of serial documents covering the period, partly because such old documents as exist are more concerned to tell what is, and less with how it has come to be, or is tending to become.

Nor was it easy study to evoke when the single catch-word '*buddha*', and the double catch-word '*vinaya-dhamma*', or its converse became a trinity: Buddha, Dhamma Sangha, such as prevails to-day in South Asia. About this I have here just this two-fold remark.

In the parting sayings ascribed to the Founder two stand out as emphatic. His successor was not twofold or threefold, but unitary: he was to be *dhamma*: the leader every man carried 'in his bosom', did he but will to listen and obey. With *dhamma*, inner guide, was linked the current term for God: 'the self': 'Live ye as they who have these two as light, as refuge — *and no other!*' In the teeth of this admonition, we meet with Suttas like 'The Top of the Banner',¹ recommending the fearful lonely monk to think *on the three* taken as alternatives, as refuge and support. Just as the governor of the next world leading to battle would bid his soldiers look to this, or to that of the deities of popular polytheism. (We have here a way in which, as in other propagandist creeds, it was sought to substitute a newer but analogous teaching.)

But note that, in the Sutta, after the alternatives, it is the first alone who is held in himself to be

¹ *Samyutta*, i. 218 f.

adequate as refuge and support. It is only in the last of the verses in which the parable is metrically taught, that we get repeated, not the first alternative, but all three. And this brings me to my other word: how what is needed to establish, not the twofold injunction of the Master, but a trinity, can here and there be traced.

In the two versions of the worship of *dhamma* adduced above,¹ we have, in the one only, this, shall I say, appendix: not only does number one revere number two (Buddha, Dhamma), but 'Moreover, monks, since the order (*sangha*) has become possessed of greatness, I hold the order also in reverence'. The one instance must here suffice as pattern, pattern of the ingenious and immense industry, that will have for years occupied the devoted monks at or around the new metropolis of Patna, as they strove, not with single-minded concern for the historically true, but with the desire to attune to new values and impress therewith, the yet oral body of sayings, brought in for standardizing to the ecclesiastical centre.

For me, the original teaching, buried in what we have for less than two centuries called 'Buddhism', was the work, by word, presence and life, of the North Indian 'laird' known as Go'tāma, son of Suddho'dāna and of Māyā. For me, during that life and for many years after it, 'buddha' meant just no more than it does in the Upanishads, the spiritually wake or wise man. To all he was just the

¹ See p. 46.

sāmaṇā Gotama. Not seldom in the verses by nuns and monks he is referred to as Gotama:

... taught me by Gotama the Wake ...
 Spread Gotama his robe and laid him down ...
 Beholding wondrous works by glorious Gotama ! ...
 doth not the mind affect
 Immeasurable of our Gotama ...
 'Twas he who taught me, even Gotama ...
 Oh! surely for the good of countless lives
 Did sister Māyā bring forth Gotama!

and Sutta-verses echo the same usage.

For the Buddhist, as in parallel usage for the Episcopalian Christian, the personal name has become almost tabu. The ways of institutional cults are strange.

One episode the scriptures give us of the Founder's life, the very last weeks of it, where it is not impossible to discern the truth about his common humanity, the absence of the superman, more than half-hidden by what I have called the frills added by editor and by artist. And it is here again that I part company from Buddhists and books.

There was much that will have tended to make his old age unhappy. Secession from the established Brahmin teaching had been slowly becoming more marked. The Arahan theory of the man consummating here on earth was ejecting the man of immanent divinity. The over-against-the-world standpoint of the growing monk-vogue was contracting the long vista of his central teaching – the Way

of the worlds. The cult of him as superman that blossomed later has blotted out this for us. But if we read with sympathy and heedfulness we shall see enough, in the episode of the Last Tour, to divine that, perhaps for these and perhaps for other reasons, the old Lion was wrath and sore at heart. It was a tour undertaken, not after the rains, the usual setting out time, but just before and after, as if in a rage of haste to accomplish before death overtook him, he could not wait.

The record makes him accompanied 'by a great company of monks', but the usual formula for this is shortened. On no other tour is he found inviting one monk or the lot to move on to another halting place; here he is shown always inviting Ānanda, *and him only*: 'Ānanda, let's go now to X.' Escorted for some way he and Ānanda may well have been, as they wearily set out again next morning. Entertained he may well have been by pious if injudicious Chunda's, giving him dishes of indigestibles such as truffles ('pig-nuts') to eat, death-dealing to aged digestion, and partaken of out of courtesy only. But the collapse under the 'twin sāl trees', the evident dismay of unaided Ānanda strongly suggest that no disciples eager to wait upon him were at hand. Too late the friend who had refused to spend his old age with him, Kassapa, comes hurrying up. And very absurd, in the wonderful patchwork to which the long Sutta of the Passing amounts to, is the way in which Sāriputta, who had predeceased him, is dragged in, not to minister -

how would he not have done that! – but to be rebuked for flattering him.

It is chiefly perhaps to art that we owe the camouflage which has hidden the unhonoured passing of this great friend of man. The artist depicts an ideal materialized oftener than the true thing in an actual happening. Bas-reliefs we see showing, not just a spread cloak, but a raised bier, with mourners around; sculptures we see of a recumbent figure, with now and then a deity superposed; this in Mahāyāna art. And at the end of the chronicle emerges that which perhaps led to its elaborate pot-pourri construction – the new relic-cult!

As I have said: it was an awkward situation for the monks where he had spent his old age, at Sāvatti whither Ānanda is shown returning with his tragic news,¹ to have had their venerable leader cutting himself loose from his living shrine, and slipping off to tell, not the set piece put into his mouth, but his very message yet once more. (He died with the Way on his lips.) Measures had to be taken to dress up that lonely resting-place of the twin trees in the imperial robes of a Superman's passing. Not less are we to blame, who have so long read without listening to what the sigh of their boughs could have told us!

¹ In the Commentaries only.

THE MASTER'S SILENCES

THE PALI SUTTAS sometimes record, that when questioned on this or that, by disciple or outsider, Gotama returned no reply, even when pressed to do so – a pressure indicated by the formula of the question thrice repeated. Writers have not wholly passed this by. I have not met with any curiosity on the matter by Buddhists. The officious commentator is given to inventing some plausible reason, such as a deliberate testing of the questioner's sincerity, in wishing, e.g., to learn from more than mere curiosity. Once or twice the records make the teacher explain, namely, that the question as put was not about matters he held he was there to reveal (*vyākaraṇi*). And once only, after the questioner had left unanswered, they make him confess to a disciple, that a reply giving a categorical Yes or No would not for such a man have made things clearer.¹

For the critical reader considering the Suttas in an historical light, the silences may not, at least not all of them, be adequately explained by the two reasons given. We see too much, in the Suttas, of the 'orthodox' compiler and editor to feel sure he may not have had difficulties here to contend withal, not

¹ *Samyutta-Nikāya*, iv. 400.

visible to us. There is, for instance, the case of a traditional reply, but handed down in such varying versions at different centres of teaching, that the revisors could not agree which was the true tradition, and held it better to convert the discordancy into a case of the Master's silence. Or it may be, that repeaters from one or more centres may have given a reply, as handed down with the question, differing so much from the teaching which the revisors' age had come to hold as orthodox, that it was held to be corrupt and was ruled out, silence being substituted. That such difficulties beset the monks at the Patna revision appears clearly from a perusal of the book of debates in the Canon, translated by S. Z. Aung and myself as *Points of Controversy* (1915).

Neither are we sure, when he is shown explaining his silence, that we are out of the editor's clutches. Thus, in one of the Mālunkya Suttas¹ he is made to say, that what he 'was there to reveal' was the so-called four truths about 'ill' discussed above. Now it is fairly evident, that if here editors have got busy, it is just the dogmas closest to the heart of the monk that will have been inserted into a perhaps varying, or semi-forgotten tradition. And I repeat, that for me no religion worthy of the name, no religion, having in it the potency to grow into a world-religion, will have been based on such a fourfold dogma, a dogma in which the chief subject 'ill' is not taken in a really religious, that is, a spiritual sense.

¹ *Majjhima*, No. 63.

That there verily were silences is quite possible. Not because he liked at times to assume the mien of a man of mystery shrouding his knowledge from questioners. He was too genuinely an Everyman's Helper for that. But it is very conceivable, that some motives or choice of queries were best met by silence. That it will have cost him perhaps unshed tears to have held out an empty hand is too much forgotten. Yet may that one explanation of his silence to Ānanda have been as full of inaudible tears as was the cry of Jesus over the casting aside of his care for Jerusalem by the doomed city.

Let me end on a vocal picture about the matter. A fellow disciple is speaking: 'I remember how he would be talking to us about man as in the way in the worlds, about the will in effort in the becoming a more. His talking would move us deeply; it was like hearing a voice speaking to the very soul, like the voice of Dhamma speaking within us. A very man-in-the-more he was for us. We would then ask him questions. Sometimes he would reply, sometimes not. We would wonder at his silence, and perhaps would ask him why he did not answer? *He* would know well whether it was the true we were seeking, or mere curiosity in us, and would reply or not accordingly.

'When he was unwilling to reply, we could see that it was painful for him. He was all for openness in man; he was never furtive. He was for us a very more in his candour. And if he did give way and reply, he showed us a more in man. We once heard

he had not replied to the question by one not of us: "Is there spirit (*attā*), or not?" and was asked by one of us, why he gave no answer. He replied, that the questioner had very foolish ideas on the subject, and was not to be made wiser by a direct answer. And we were told he was very sad in so saying and had even wept. We often noted the weariness he felt at times over the bringing aid to men in the Way.'

I have not noticed, that the 'feature of the Buddha's silences' has received the attention it deserves from Buddhists. Perhaps this again is due to the fact, that they who talk and write most know least of their scriptures. But of German writers Oldenberg and Beckh gave due attention to it. Where they fell short was in their wholesale acceptance, that what the Founder is *said* to have said, he did say; was in their failure to weigh the motives and revising work of the later editors, the compilers of the masses of 'sayings' into sorted discourses.

Thus, the rumour about Gotama, introducing some Suttas: 'Hush! here he comes! he is a lover of silence!' may well have been a feature in the growing cult of the superman. So will have been the parable of the few leaves plucked from a tree compared in number with the whole foliage, to show, so he is made to say, how little he revealed when he could have revealed so much more. This was not the little way of this great man. He is shown denying that what he revealed of friends departed was to 'show off' how much more he knew than others.

And more: there is another possible reason for his

silences than occurred to these too uncritical writers. May it not be, that the effect on educated religious students of his day of the acceptance of Immanence, taught as it was taught, was to encourage easy prattling about the being and attributes of That Whom I have here referred to, not as God, Source, Creator, but as Most, Highest, Best; as *Agga*, as *Attha*, as *Param'attha*, as Beyond-that? That 'art' Thou, they were taught, when once thou verily knowest it. A heady and dangerous way; not, on the face of it, a true one. There was so much more in the 'art' than a mere copula in speech.

No one to my knowledge has shown up the wisdom of the Founder's silences as due to his sense of reticence in matters as yet inconceivable by man. Yet it was just a wise reticence hereon – Job's 'I will lay my hand upon my mouth' – that his age made an urgent need. Will they who lightly talk about 'the silence in Buddhism' about this and that bear this in mind?

IS MAN A MERE COMPLEX?

SINCE I BEGAN, thirty-seven years ago, to publish the results of inquiry into what I found in Pali literature, canonical, and other, on the man and his 'make-up', I have had time and opportunity to learn things I then had not come to know. Of these I add here yet one more: I have called it 'a new note strenuously affirmed', in the last few years, out of conviction of the sins of youth, out of conviction that I had come to see the thing more truly than before. This is, that the resolution of the whole man into five groups (*khandha's*, or *skandha's*) is an editorial increment quite out of date for, and unworthy of, the teaching of the first Sakyan missionaries, as well as being impossible in a message taken about for Everyman. Here, I have said, I am charging wind-mills, but in this case I hold it an honour to be a Don Quixote. My tilting has consisted in this:

Buddhists, in placing the senses foremost in studying man's mind, long before we did, had worsened the idea of the man, as the subject, the self, to whom sensations were, as we say, presented. They had made the mind, as a sort of sense, generally recipient, into a dummy-man, not seeing (*we are*

little if any better) that 'mind' is but a name for ways of wielding body, neural or muscular or both. At some unknown period, their teachers came to group the man as a complex of body with four lumps¹ of mind-ways: a man-less quincunx. The four were distinguished as affective awareness (*vedānā*, described in terms of pleasure and pain), percipient awareness (*saññā*), and perceptual activity, or the putting items of sense-awareness together: *sankhāra*'s); finally yet another term of awareness, also associated in definition with the senses, usually translated by either 'cognition' or 'consciousness', namely *viññāṇa*; literally, discriminative (*vi*-) knowing (*ññāṇa*).

Had they but left the last to bear its older meaning, their grouping had been less confused and more plausible. For *viññāṇa* was an alternative term for the 'man', used when he was considered as surviving death, and as not of earth-life only. Thus, at a man's deathbed, one, psychically gifted, might, as Gotama is said to have done, seen clairvoyantly the deceased in his other-world body, after he had left his 'discarded clothes' that lay prone, and had not yet gone to the next world.² And it is interesting to read, in a Sutta,³ where the message of a new truth for men is brought by messengers to the 'city', that in the midst of this, receiving them, sits the Man, not as 'being' or as 'self', but as *viññāṇa*, the man as concerned with life not of this world only. And in one Sutta, we see this *viññāṇa*-factor retained as the man


¹ *Rāṣī*: the Commentator's own word for *khandha*.

² *Samyutta-Nikāya*, i. 120, &c.

³ Op. cit., iv. 193 f.

or self, called not *viññāṇa* but 'monk', reviewing his four components, named as they are just here.¹

Had this Sutta been made measure and norm for the orthodox teaching about what man is, psychologically considered, no condemnation of the five-fold *khandha*-group as such would have come into my pages. We should then have had the man analysed thus:



As it is, this Sutta is more of a 'left-in' than as having any doctrinal super-eminence.

Had I space I could show more such betrayals of a relatively late emergence of this resolution of the man and his instruments into a mere complex of instruments. The mere complex, if it came late – so late that the book, giving lists of five points in the teaching *omits this five from the titles* of such pentads, and only inserts them in it in discourse – the 'mere complex' none the less took firm hold in a culture, where the 'man' had been banished. And to-day a monk will say, in letter or in print – I have both –

¹ *Anguttara-Nikāya*, ii, 217.

if the five 'khandhas' do not cover the man, what in the world is there left over? One recent writer to this effect had left England after a course of university studies, and almost I blush to think his alien *alma mater* had not whipped any such foolish idea out of him.¹

The five were said, by the chief of Buddhist exegetists, to have been fixed upon by the Founder because, taken together, they exclude all room for the self, that is for the man as user of the five. There is no warrant in the scriptures for this assumption, but Buddhaghosa was given to putting his own frills on to his great Founder. In that writer we do not find any sense of historic growth in culture, nor should we expect to find it from his age or country.

But the scriptures betray unawares this growth, growth in a worse, actually coming about. In the Suttas we see a current teaching about man as *viññāṇa*, confronted with the new worsening of the term, and given the hallowing seal of the Master's fiat.² *Viññāṇa*, as 'the persisting experiencer and speaker', is reduced to mere cognitive awareness, following on sensations. And this in terms unequalled for sharpness of reprimand and cogent catechizing.

If we keep in view, as few writers do, this earlier meaning of *viññāṇa* as a term, not for mental faculty but for the man, we shall understand the zest with which editors explicitly banned that earlier meaning

¹ The *alma mater*, too, of James Ward!

² *Majjhima-Nikāya*, No. 38.

from one, and one only of the five factors. We nowhere find any of the other four taken to represent a user of the rest, the captain, so to speak, of the crew. Often in the Suttas recurs the formula not to see 'the self', that is, the superman, in any of the five. But this is an elaboration of the Second Utterance¹ where men are warned not to confuse the self with the instruments, and does not amount to a denial of the self's existence. It implicitly affirms his existence as a More than the instruments.²

Yet among 'southern' Buddhists nothing is so strenuously maintained as the formula: 'everything is impermanent, ill, not-self'. Now for me no great helper of men, founding a new teaching likely to become a world-religion, will have taught to the Many such a negative gospel of man-in-the-less as this. Even as a recoil from the great uplift in the concept of man as was the current teaching, it is unthinkable. A new movement, if it be worthy of its day, 'fulfils', that is, expands what it finds is 'the law'; it does not stamp on it.

The trinity of the 'marks-of-everything' formula can be historically explained, if I here repeat, as the main causes, the three influences at work during the centuries between the birth of the movement and the revision and standardizing milestone set up at Patna in Asoka's day. These were (1) the growing vogue of monasticism; (2) the growing interest in man's inner world of 'mind' and its uniformities; (3) the widening rift between the movement and the

¹ See p. 33.

² See p. 35.

academic Brahminic teaching known to us by the early Upanishads.

The first two marks (transience, ill) belong to the pessimistic aspect of life taken by the world-forsaking monk; the third (not-self) is mainly the work of the new 'psychology' and the 'rift'. In this last, the early protest of the new movement, against the importance attached in popular observance to the rite, the sacrifice, and to the monopoly of distinction claimed as his birthright by the Brahmin, gradually extended to the central, the more esoteric items of his religion: the immanence of the Deity in the man. From all three marks, the 'man', once taught as being a wonderful More in potency, came to be looked upon as a pitiful Less; not exactly as with us, a 'miserable sinner', but as a crumbling momentary complex, beset by 'ill', but *capable* of just a span of perfect manhood only by utter renunciation of all that tended towards repetition (that is, by rebirth) of himself as man.

A term indicative of the altered, worsened outlook that arose about 'the man' is seen in the use of the word *puggāla* for the older *purisa* (Sanskrit, *purusha*). This word is not, I believe, met with in pre-Pali literature. Here we meet it, not in the records of the earliest episodes cited in these pages, but often in the Suttas and post-Pitākan literature. And that its meaning was depreciatory is plain by the fanciful exegetical definition. In this the first syllable, which means just 'male', is evaded, and the word is paraphrased as 'hell-swallower'. We

cannot render the term easily in translation; the nearest would be our slang terms 'bloke', 'blighter', 'bean'. But the innovation is an approach to our own Puritanical 'miserable sinner', 'child of Satan'. And in that translators have equated the word with 'man', showing no historical sense in the matter, no awareness of changed values, is yet another bad mark in their *dossier*, as tending to blind, to mislead readers.

It has been a strange tragedy, the stranger because in Indian idiom the 'man' meant, not as with us the visible person, suggesting by his acts a more than bodily apparatus somehow 'within', working the body, but what we call the 'I', or the soul, or self, or spirit. Herein for that idiom lay man's true reality. We have largely misused our terms for the unseen, immaterial 'man', using them in a less as implying, in 'self', egoism, or, in 'soul', 'spirit', a mere wraith or appanage of man. We fall back on 'person', 'individual', good as signifying unitary entity, yet poor in derivation, meaning only 'a part assumed' (the mask, *persona*), or a bit of just anything.¹ And we lack the better European terms: *homo* or *Mensch*, these including both sexes.

It will only be when we have adjusted our cultural, our religious balance, and have come to see the man's true reality precisely in that of him *whom we do not see*, that we may hope to influence Buddhists – as Western ideals have in much influenced them – and point the way to release from the jungle in which the

¹ We hear wine-tasters assuming 'individuality' in a wine.

'man' lies ambushed. We shall not do this by any shallow judging, that the man is, ultimately considered, a 'product' of bodily and mental conditions: verily a cart-before-horse assumption. With such a theory we cannot teach Buddhists that their funny taking over, by their leading commentators, of the simile of the chariot to be a fit analogy for the complete man does not hold water. The nun, who is the accredited author – poor lass! – was in sore affliction, and insisted nothing was real but sorrow – *her* sorrow of course! Compared with that, your 'being', she wailed, is just put together of parts that will break up and no better than any cart, carriage.

If we once have firmly grasped, that the 'man', the *homo* is More than just that, that the man is not just the experience, the ways of mind, but experiencer, but mind-er, we shall then, and not till then, be fit to 'teach a More than that'.

SYMPATHY

HERE FINALLY I make restatement, not of a formula, but only of a term that has become, as we now say, a slogan. This is not to get restive with the Pali word: *anukampā*; it is to regret that we all, I think, all, agree in rendering it by 'compassion', when, as I now hold, sympathy were the truer rendering.¹ The Pali word means 'vibrating-in-accordance-with' (*anu-*, as in the Greek prefix *ana-*). *Kamp-* is used for any thrill, from an earthquake downwards. My regret is due to this: that whereas, in compassion, there is ever a 'telepathy' as from a greater to a less, a better to a worse, there is nothing of the sort apparent in *anukampā*. For instance, in the *Sutta-Nipāta* (37), we read:

Friends, comrades, with these sympathizing
(*anukampamāno*)

he with mind bound to them his own weal ruins,

(and for this unworthy reason, he is held to do well to become a recluse!). And other such contexts might be quoted, where 'compassion' introduces a misfitting note. But 'sympathy' words nothing of a More

¹ Let readers of my *Sakya* (1931), if there be any, consider that I would now read, as 'Crown of the New Word', sympathy, not compassion.

bending over a Less, of the pity of a more fortunate for one less so. St. Peter bids disciples have the one and the other for each other. We read not seldom of the compassion felt by Jesus, where the curious association of the Greek term with visceral movement may have something in common with the origin of the Pali (and Sanskrit) word. We read also of Gotama that he – it is a legendary tale – gave his life to feed a hungry beast, a tradition found surviving in India by Chinese ‘pilgrims’ centuries later. But ‘compassion’ for the bodily needs is very rarely found as told of him. His work was to save by the word, and possibly by what we call the magnetism of his presence. And in his word of the Road, he seems to me to be getting past the warding of the fellow-wayfarer’s body, and placing what we call his ethics in a sympathy between the man of the road and the ‘other man’, also of the road.

That men loved his memory for his help is less well worded by calling it his compassion. Compassion is not a New Word, since there have ever been mothers. It comes nearer to pity, for which there is also the word *karuṇā*, the second of those four ways of divine living.¹ And when once we get to sayings where later piety has not brought in self-glorification, it is sympathy that we can feel in the ways in which this man of the Sakyas sought to draw and instruct his fellows.

Welfare and sympathy are mine
when I another teach:²

¹ See p. 93.

² *Samyutta* i, iii.

here is a better translation than what I used twenty years ago, and again

Whate'er the apparent cause whereby men live
In fellowship, that is not true of me.
In mind I sympathize, and if with mind
Thus satisfied I spend my life
Instructing other men, I am thereby
In nowise bound as by a yoke; kindness
It is that moveth me and sympathy.¹

Here we have a man willing the welfare of the fellow-man, not as *de haut en bas*, not as a God-man stooping to a less than he. He wills that welfare as one who sees in the other the More, the potency that is in himself. He wills, so seeing, as very man in sympathy with very man; with one who is fellow-wayfarer in the road towards the Immortal, the Ever-More in life.

¹ *ibid.*, p. 206.

JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT

SO OUR LAWYERS SAY, when in a case, defendant or plaintiff fails to appear and judgement is given in his absence. Now the fact of 'default', or failure to appear in scripture, *just where we should have expected to see something*, is a feature I have only considered with some thoroughness since my works of the past ten years were published. No one had given me here a lead. I only stumbled on this remarkable and plentiful default when, and as, the Pali Text Society was publishing Messrs. Woodward and Hare's translation of the Fourth Collection: the *Anguttārā-Nikāya*. I ought to have noticed the default years earlier, when I was editing, to some extent only, Mabel Hunt's Index volume of that Collection, that is, in 1910. For I then added to this an index of all the titular subjects, grouped, as is known, under numbers in arithmetical progression (thus, section of Ones, Twos, &c., up to the Elevens). And I ought to have noticed the curious absence of titles which, did Buddhists think with historical truth about their religion, they would look to have found mentioned among the Numbers, doctrines by which they are taught to-day. For example, the Four Truths should have been entered under the Fours, the

Eightfold 'Path' under the Eights, not, as is the case, under the Threes. *Mea culpa!* I did not notice. In that immature time I had not yet been invited to 'write about Buddhism'. I dealt with what I found as I found it.

The translation of the 'Book of the Gradual Sayings', as we called the *Fourth Nikāya*, taught me much, and it was then I noticed this curious and so far unnoticed, unexplained default. Dr. Winternitz, who left us last year, drew attention in print to my brief comment, also in print, on the matter. And I replied to his challenge for closer investigation with an article¹ I have here, by permission, reproduced. But since for the general reader it may be technically dull, I have consigned it to an Appendix.

It may further be better there than in these chapters, because, in what it reveals, it is a negative strengthening of evidence, rather than any positive survival of that which for me constitutes original Buddhism. That certain doctrines, namely, now held to have been of 'the old rock', to have been 'there' from the beginning: *von jeher*, as Dr. von Glasenapp put it, may, by the testimony, the negative testimony of the *Anguttara*, be summoned for default — this is a serious charge not easily to be met by believers in the 'from the beginning', when once they will bring themselves to look carefully into their scriptures. The question must arise: Why were these doctrines, called by the orthodox 'central

¹ In the *Viśva-Bharati Quarterly*, 'An Inquiry into Buddhist Cataloguing'.

from the first', here left out? Nothing can satisfactorily be proved on negative evidence, 'by default', alone; but such evidence may go far to confirm grounds more positive, but where what is contributive is slender in weight.

THUS FAR

THE QUEST in these pages has been the gospel brought to man, man as he was in the Ganges valley of the sixth century B.C., by the helper now called the Buddha, if haply that gospel might, to some extent, be found. The claim in these pages is made, that to some extent at least that gospel may be traced, and disentangled from much superstructure.

What, by way of summary, has here been presented as essentials in his teaching?

It has been claimed, that the Helper was not evolving a new teaching as the product of his own unaided meditations; he was a man inspired. No claim has been made, that inspiration came immediately from the Highest. Concerning this the wisest among us is not in a position to affirm. We are only able to say, that from what we may call the Unseen an urge came to him to teach, and to teach by a given clue. Now this episode is usually put down to a superstitious legend. For me it is more true than much we read in the scriptures.

It has been claimed, that the line of help to be given to men was, that man is essentially, not a static being but one in perpetual becoming, either becoming 'better', or becoming worse, and that he may be

helped to become better by being taught about the More that lies in him to become. But that this becoming needs at every step the co-working of his will. That this belongs to the centre of original Buddhism, and sprang from the teaching of the Helper's day is overlooked. Words not to hand were needed to put this teaching more clearly; the new message has not always the fit word. And where there occurs often the word: 'become', translations have done their obscuring best to prevent us from realizing it.

It is often claimed, that the original message ignored, if it did not in so many words deny, the reality of the Highest in religion's mandate. In these pages it is claimed that the original 'Buddhism' both began and ended with a recognition of that reality, but that the teaching of its day had presented that reality in the changed guise of Immanence, a presentment followed by the Founder of Buddhism. The word 'self' had become transfigured as indwelling holy spirit. Here again translations of Buddhist sayings have obscured this fact. It is further claimed, that he substituted a new more dynamic *immanent* theism in the word 'dhamma' for the word 'self'.

It is claimed that the importance lent to the idea of 'ill' is a monastic excrescence, bringing down the original teaching to the level of a 'doctor'-gospel. Religion is not primarily concerned with the healing of such facts of bodily life as birth, old age, disease, and dying.

It is claimed that the central figure of life as a way

or road was originally applied to progress in the worlds, as the true perspective of man's effort in his quest towards the ultimate goal, and not to an ethical code of eight parts applied to this life only. That it was the 'Way of Becoming', the set of eight being a later insertion.

It is claimed that the current idea for the Highest: 'the undying' or immortal, was taught by the original gospel, but was blotted out thus:— the Founder of 'Buddhism' has been, in the tradition, confused with an unnamed teacher of the current vogue for seeing causal uniformities in the new teaching of mental analysis, the dominance of which did so much to deflect original Buddhism from its primary aim.

It is claimed, that 'the Aim', not 'nirvana' was the original way in which original Buddhism worded the ultimate goal. Other terms were 'supreme aim' (*paramattha*) and 'peak of the immortal' (*amatagga*).

It is claimed, that the original teaching brought the Unseen, as being the greater part of the Way of Life, into the foreground of religion, and that the Founder and his friends, a few of them very 'psychic', enjoined strongly what was called '*jhāna*' (musing) as a preparation for psychic experience.

It is claimed, that the teaching of moral televolution known as the Four Divine States was the gospel of a contemporary Brahmin, and was adopted by original Buddhism, but was not of its essence.

It is claimed, that the term 'Buddha' became applied exclusively to Gotama (and certain predecessors) more than a century after his death, when


the cult of him as superhuman, of Church and of codified teaching, was growing.

It is claimed, that for the occasional refusals to reply on the Founder's part more than one reason is possible; that in his day reticence on highest things was especially called for; that silence may have cost him much.

It is claimed, that the seeing the 'man' as a five-fold complex is a late invasion of the new psychology, and at first comprised body, the mind as threefold, the 'man' coming to be taught as body and a fourfold mind.

It is claimed, that the idea of 'compassion', often ranked as the central teaching, is more truly rendered as 'sympathy'.

APPENDIX



APPENDIX

'JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT'

IN a recent article on 'Problems of Buddhism',¹ Dr. Winternitz had the following footnote (p. 47): 'The absence of the four truths and the eightfold path as items in the Four-section and Eight-section of the Anguttara Nikāya (see Mrs. Rhys Davids in Journal of the R. A. S., 1935, pp. 721 ff.) is indeed striking. But a closer investigation of the Anguttara will be necessary to find out on what principle items have been included in this Nikāya (and in the Sangīti and Dasuttara of the Dīgha), before we can draw conclusions from this omission.'

A reasonable demurring. Let me here begin a closer investigation.

In view of (a) the wide sweeping-in of doctrines shown in these three catalogues, (b) the fairly safe conclusion, that it takes some time in the history of a 'Church' for a formula to emerge, and (c) the fact, that the history of any religion is a history of changing values, I judged, concerning the 'absences' referred to, that they were due to this or that portion of the catalogue, which omitted, having been framed *before* certain numerical formulas had been *drafted as orthodox*, tenets of prime importance.

But the question then arises: Did the catalogues in question profess to include everything that was orthodox doctrine? Or at least, if no profession to this effect accompanies these scriptural lists, is it perhaps possible, that the lists include only such topics as are, for some

¹ *Viśva-Bharati Quarterly* (New Series), II. 1.

reason, not 'duly' emphasized in the residual scripture, and are hence sets of so many postscripts to the other Suttas? Even if this can account for the omissions, then we should not expect to find among the included items *any* tenet of acknowledged leading importance, since these tenets would rank as such in virtue of the fact that they did receive due emphasis elsewhere, and hence did not require to be swept-in after such a quasi-apologetic fashion. *But we do find such included.*

Or were the specified formulas-of-number omitted, because, albeit they had been drafted when the Lists were compiled, they were not then held in sufficient esteem, they had not yet won suffrages enough, to warrant their being included? Of the 'left wing' only perhaps? Not then such as could be 'chanted together by all, not disputed about'?¹

Or were they indeed, as I suggested, *emergences in the Sangha's changing values, more or less alien to the earlier teaching?*

There may possibly be other reasons discoverable for the omissions. So far I can think of no other, and it is to be regretted that, in recognizing my overdue discovery as being 'remarkable', the learned and lamented Doctor should not have helped us with his own speculations in the matter. If Buddhists and writers on Buddhism had not for years harped on certain tenets as 'central' and 'basic' in Buddhism: the four truths, the way as eightfold, the three marks in everything (*anicca, dukkha, anattā*), release (*vimutti*), the three refuges (*buddha, dhamma, sangha*), the five khandhas, the goal as, not '*attha*' (*attha samparāyika*), but nirvana, or nirvana *plus* three other things (*sambodhi, abhiññā, upasamā, nibbāna*)² — these omissions would not seem so strange and unaccountable. But as it is, they hold up a glaring red-light

¹ Sangīti Suttanta.

² The First Utterance.

of 'stop!' to such harping, until and unless a satisfactory reason is forthcoming for the 'absence' of such so-called cardinal items in lists, which have the appearance at least of being very comprehensive.

Can we then point to any context in text or commentary declaring, in any of the three cataloguings, a principle of in-, or of ex-clusion? In the commentaries on Digha and Anguttara I have so far found none. But I gladly admit, that a more searching study may tell us something. If so, the telling will be of the tradition as worded in Buddhaghosa's Pali recasting of the Sinhalese commentaries which he found in Ceylon and recast in Pali. That is, we shall have Buddhaghosa's own view about what he found in MSS. handed down (with an indefinite amount of making of fresh copies) during the four or five hundred years since the first written recensions (as stated in the *Dīpavamsa*) were made (c. 80 B.C.). And in this, his 'own view', he will either faithfully have repeated what he found in Sinhalese MSS., or he will have stated his personal opinion. I do not hold him incapable of doing the latter. We see him, e.g., very probably doing it in imputing to the Founder a reason for introducing a fivefold skandha-doctrine, for which in the *Piṭakas* there is no justification.¹

A good opening was given him in the introduction to the *Saṅgīti Suttanta*. It is a rarely vivid picture: the Mallas of Pāvā, having built a new municipal hall, invite the aged Gotama on his tour to honour it by opening it, as we say. The scene is described, albeit the Founder's address is totally forgotten. Verily the 'new men', of whom Ānanda wailed 'They please me not at all',² no longer paid heed to their Chief's words! Then comes possibly the Appendix, viz. the Catalogue. Gotama is weary, after the laity depart, and Sāriputta

¹ See p. 114.

² *Theragāthā*.

(who had predeceased him!) is resurrected to go on and address only the quiet-sitting, patient monks. He is represented as anxious to forestall schisms, such as were said to be proceeding in the Jaina Sangha after the decease of its Founder. He calls on his assembly, seeing they had a well-imparted teaching (*dhamma*), to institute 'a chanting together in concord without wrangling, for the long survival of the Brahma-living'. Then abruptly follows the list, from one 'single doctrine' (*eko dhammo*) to the following nine more sub-sections of doctrines. But to all this Buddhaghosa makes no inquiry as to selection, and we are left with the inference, that the 'recital' was to include every doctrine about which there was complete agreement as to its orthodoxy. The List is as follows:

One	.	.	.	1	Sixes	.	.	.	22
Twos	.	.	.	33	Sevens	.	.	.	14
Threes	.	.	.	60	Eights	.	.	.	11
Fours	.	.	.	50	Nines	.	.	.	6
Fives	.	.	.	26	Tens	.	.	.	6
<hr/>					<hr/>				
170					59,				
					229 in all.				

In the Dasuttara List which has only fifty-five items we can rightly speak of a principle of selection determining its contents. We start with ten *reasons why* certain teachings should be considered in certain ways. Clearly a carefully selected list; hence it should better reflect the orthodoxy of its date of compilation. The things recommended for study are such as 'help much, are to be made-to-become, to be understood, to be put away, belong to decline, lead to distinction (or eminence), are hard to penetrate, are to be brought to pass, to be thoroughly learnt (*abhiññeyya*), to be realized'.

We may here find food for historical weighing. Thus, among the ten reasons, the early injunction to seek (*gavesati*) has vanished, and with it that early word for the Goal of seeking: *attha*. Dropped already from the First Utterance (only the negative is retained), it will have come to mean (only 'meaning' or 'cause'¹). Here are already two reasons for seeing in the Dasuttara an outlook very far removed from really 'primitive' Buddhism. As Goal Nibbāna has come in and sits firmly enthroned.

Finally, the Anguttara. Its lists total 9,557 – so the Commentary. They present not a few parallel but variant versions, i.e. where the 'text' of the Sutta is identical, but the exposition different – a very natural result where repeaters have come in from different centres to a Council of Revision, and the judge, or judges have decided that the two or more versions are equally orthodox. But as to any principle of selection in these or in the Dasuttara, Buddhaghosa, so far as I see, offers no comment.

It is not within the scope of this little book to give in detail the subject-matter of these three great Lists. All that I can possibly do here is to cite (as I have partly done elsewhere) the numbered formulas which constitute, for Hinayāna Buddhists and for most writers on Buddhism, the original teaching, and examine to what extent they find a place in the Lists. But first I trust I may be allowed space for stating in brief outline the nature of the titles under which the various subjects have found admission. If these reveal any principle of selection, so much the better, but I am dubious.

In Mabel Hunt's Index volume to the Anguttara (P.T.S., 1910), I made a complete alphabetical table of these titles. From this we may compile a synopsis of

¹ *Hetu jānāti*. Ang. Comm., iii. 283, on the term *atthaññu*.

them, thus: Many items are presented as so many things or *dhammā*: here the Digha Suttantas adopt this term throughout in introducing each subsection: *Katamo eko dhammo? Katame dve (dhammā, or Katamo eko dhammo) bahukāro . . . pariññeyyo*, &c. In the Anguttara many others are presented as *anga's*, as *paccaya's*, as *thāna's*, *dhātu's*, as *āyatana's*, *vatthu's*,¹ &c. Of these, only the first and the last three appear in the Dasuttara.

We have then, in the Anguttara, many items concerning the man, mainly in the term that had come in with the worsened concept of the man: *puggala*, there being relatively few survivals in which the more honourable *purisa* is retained. The Digha shows a relatively slight interest in the man. It was in 'ideas about' the man, that the scholastic monk-world had come to be mainly interested, when these two Suttantas were compiled.

We have next a number of objective matters in man's life: such as the bourns in his life (*gati's*), sick men (*gilāna's*), gifts, greetings, &c. Then there is a much greater number of subjective matters in values: *agga's* (highest things), *attha's* (aims), *āpatti's*, *ānisamsā's* (attainments, profits), growths (*vuddhi's*), &c.

And there is the long list of morally bad items and their opposites: cankers (*āsava's*), fetters (*samyojana's*) . . . *viññā's*, calm (*passaddhi's*), the first much outdistancing the others. These are all fairly equally represented in both Anguttara and Sangīti. There are finally things to which man is likened, or the training of him, such as the horse (I do not find the elephant here), mangoes, jars, clouds, &c.; these in Anguttara only.

For an adequate study, here impossible, of the subject, it would be necessary to enlarge this synopsis from the

¹ Technical terms for conditions, occasions, elements or data, spheres, bases.

A., and compare it with the D. lists. One feature in the grouping, occurring only in the A. List, may not be without historic importance. It is this. From the Sixes, there is a beginning of making the requisite number out of two groups of three each: either of opposites: e.g. conditions pleasing to the Bhagavā, or displeasing (341 f.) or of things somehow associated, e.g. 3 *tanhā's* and 3 *māna's* (445). In the Sevens this is continued (43; 82). Similarly in the Eights. But in the Nines this device is oftener resorted to, and with this difference, that the complementary lists – usually of 5 and 4 – have sometimes no visible bond of connexion. Usually one is doctrinally much more prominent than the other, e.g. 5 *cetokhila's* and 4 *satippaṭṭhāna's*. And the latter is invariably put *after the former*. I shall return to this.

I could have made these notes ampler, but without throwing any further light on any Leitmotif of guiding principle in selection. So far as I have any knowledge of the Suttas, I seem to find here expressed a desire to catalogue, not this or that, but *everything that there is in them which served in teaching doctrine*. I am open to correction, but I cannot as yet find any such things in the Suttas which do not here find echo.

I come then to those subjects which in such doctrinal cataloguing we *should all expect to find*. And these are:

In the Ones: (a) Nirvana; (b) release (liberty, deliverance): *vimutti*;

In the Threes: the Three Refuges (Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, or with the sometimes appended fourth item of saintly virtues),

In the Threes, the Three Marks in everything: transience, ill, not-self,

In the Threes the Three Roots (*lobha, dosa, moha*);

In the Fours: the Four Truths,

In the Fours: the Four Divine States;
 In the Fives: the Five Khandhas of body and mind;
 In the Eights: the Eightfold Way, usually called Path.

Last, but not least, but not usually so insisted upon as original; the List called later Parts or Wings of Enlightenment (*bôdhi-pakkhiya*), said to have been a special dying charge of the Founder to his Order, which they 'should practise, meditate upon and spread abroad':¹

Three Fours, the Stations of Mindfulness (*saiṇṇapatt-hānā*), the Right Efforts (*sammāpādhānāni*), the Steps to Psychic Power (*iddhipādā*).

Two Fives, the Faculties of spiritual sense (*indriyāni*), the Strengths (*balāni*).

The Seven, the Parts of Enlightenment (*bojjhangā*).

The Eight, the Eightfold Way.

I am not unreasonable in claiming, that in any comprehensive Catalogue, evidently of doctrinal importance, the foregoing Lists, or numbered formulas would have been given right of entry, and be found, not merely as referred to, or, also, applied, in exposition of any item, *but as titular items*.

What we actually find is, that as titular items they are largely, though not wholly, absent! Thus in the titles of subjects:

Of the Ones, Nirvana is absent in the Catalogues of all the three works, appearing only in the Nines (A.) as Ninefold Nibbāna (pp. 453 ff.).

Of the Ones, Vimutti is equally so, appearing only in the Fives (A.) as five spheres of release (p. 21), and five things, the fruit of mental release (p. 84), and as five ideas maturing release (p. 243), &c.

¹ D. ii. 120.

Of the Threes, I do not find the Three Refuges.

Of the Threes, the Three marks (not yet so-called) occur only in the Sangīti in the Fives, as modes of 'conceiving the maturing of liberty'.

Of the Fours, the Truths do not appear in A. save incidentally (p. 202); not in Sangīti; only in Da., where they appear with the usual adjective *ariya*, and 'should be well learnt'. The Divine States appear, not in A., but only in Sangīti as the Four Infinites (*appamaññāyo*, p. 223), not in Dasuttara.

Of the Fives, the *khandha*'s do not appear in A. But the *first four* appear in the Fours, in the Sutta 'Sokhummaṇi', the Subtle things, the fifth, *viññāna*, being still reserved for 'the man' who *has* the *khandha*'s.¹ But they are placed first in the Sangīti Fives, and in Da. they are also placed as 'to be understood'.

Of the Eights, the Eightfold Way is neither in A., nor in Sangīti, only in Da., where it is, as usual, 'to be made-to-become'. But the Way occurs in A. titles *in the Tens, in the Threes*, and while in Sangīti we have the 'eightfold' *without reference to a Way*, viz. as the eight fitnesses or rightnesses (*sammattā*), opposed by eight wrongnesses (*michattā*).

The entries of the 'Parts of Enlightenment' are equally erratic. Take the Fours: To the *Satippaṭṭhānas*, *Sammappadhānas* and *Iddhipādās* is given place of honour in Sangīti, but in Da. only the first is admitted. In A. not one of the three Fours appears *till the Nines*, and then, as if to make good, the first appears nine times, the second once, the third twice, coupled with a Five-category: five bondages, thus making up the nine.

¹ See p. 113 f.

Of the Fives, the Indriyas appear in Sangīti and Da., but not in A., save as Four, without 'faith' (*saddhā*). The Bala's appear in all three, and in A., also as Four, 'faith' omitted (pp. 141 f., 252).

Of the Sevens, the Bojjhanga's appear duly in all three.

With the Way I have dealt. And I would remind readers, that its older form as being *without the 'eightfold'* is suggested by the fact, that, in the last, the Great Section of the Samyutta-Nikāya, not the last, but the first section is given to the Way. And whereas in the Suttas the Way has been edited into its eightfold and ariyan frills, the Section is entitled just 'Way': Magga-vagga.

The question at once arises: why then is 'Way' absent, in all three Catalogues, from the Ones? Why indeed? Way and choice of it stands at the head of the Charter of the Teaching (miscalled 'sermon'); the whole rationale of the Sakyans' gospel is that by Wayfaring, i.e. by the life, the man can become That Who he innately is. Salvation is represented as 'a way going to end of ill'. Whence then the silence here?

Decline in way-teaching there certainly was. In *only two Suttas*, out of the hundreds put into the mouth of the Founder, is he shown making the Way a matter of live teaching.¹ Fitted to be a gospel for Everyman, we find the Way here and there reserved as for the culminating step in the progress of the monk.² I am inclined to think, that when the eight 'fitnesses' were inserted before the word Way (as I believe they were, I repeat, to replace some such word which had become discredited as *bhava*; — cf. *bhava-chakka*),³ attention be-

¹ *Majjhima*, No. 107; *Samyutta*, iii, 'Tissa.'

² e.g. *Samyutta*, ii. 38, iv. 133, 177, 232, 251; *Majjh*, No. 143.

³ *Visuddhi-magga*, 577.

came diverted, from the wayfaring as such, to the mental and moral qualities enjoined in the 'eight'.

One answer is that we do find a titular Way, but it is called, not *magga*, but *paṭipadā* (cf. above, p. 65), and it is placed, not at the beginning, but at the very end of the Threes: - the course of worldly impulse, that of asceticism and the 'middle' course; this being described in a variety of ways (cf. above, p. 68)!

But there is another possible reason, and that is the way taught as Fourfold. Does Way appear under any of the Fours in this light? Yes and No. Sangīti definitely has 'way' as Fourfold under both Fours and Eights. But emphasis is laid on the several 'fruits' (*phala*), which were technically distinguished from the wayfaring towards them (*paṭipanna*) in the Fourfold Way. This was because the main thing in monk-life had become, not so much the nearing a positive goal as the increasing remoteness from living over again. As I have said above, the disbanded Greek soldiers were become more intent on saying 'No more land!' than on shouting 'The sea! The sea!' Wayfarer's progress is merged in Wayfarer's looking back over his shoulder. Neither Da. nor A. gives in this connexion either a Four or an Eight. But both A. and Sangīti, in the Fours, note four qualities in the First stage-and-fruit: that of the 'Streamwinner' (*sotāpanna*); this is all. In no way is it a worthy recognition of the great figure of the Road.

Well! Can we, with thus much of inadequate inspection, come to any provisional conclusions about these three Catalogues?

I would suggest in the first place, that to speak here of a guiding principle of selection *were a mistake*. It would not be so (a) if we were considering a choosing being made from a finished mass of material; (b) if we were considering the 'church'-selectors as an unchanging

measure of values. In both cases the fact was otherwise. Placing ourselves in North India of the fifth to the third century B.C., we can see, that the amassing those thousands of Suttas will have been a very long business, however it was done. It was a bookless, trainless, car-less world. It is more likely, that any and every saying, reported at a centre where 'repeating' was carefully handed on, will have been 'included' in the Stock of such, and only tested as to orthodoxy on occasion of a revising standardizing Council.

It is here that we come to a possible 'principle of selection' being to some extent found necessary. Where several Suttas gave differing expositions of a common text, all may have been let stand; the A. has plenty of such. But in some cases repeaters will have recited sayings at variance from the changed, changing orthodoxy of the day. And it is there that certain sayings may have been 'turned down'. But again, there may have been sayings, found little if at all in provincial versions, which had come to be drafted as approved by the revising metropolitan centre. These will have certainly 'gone into' the Catalogues, often into a special place of distinction. Cf. the five khandha's in Sangiti: 'Fives', i and ii, with their 'titular' absence in the A. Fives. There is of course nothing unique in this proceeding as an historical fact in the life of churches. I am old enough to remember hearing as a young girl reverberations of the impressions produced by the Decree of Infallibility of 1870, and even those of the Bull '*Ineffabilis*' on Immaculate Conception of 1854.

When we can bring ourselves frankly to admit, that the 'church' and its editorial standards had undergone profound changes (largely in religious worsening), when achieving the compiling of the Canon or Tipiṭaka, we may then begin to weigh truly the procedure in these

Catalogues. They certainly present three degrees of in-, or ex-clusiveness in selection. The sweeping-in is fairly manifest as dominant in the Anguttara. The changing values in the (? revising) sweepers are more manifest in the other two. I am not pretending, that, in A., the sections were, so to speak, kept open for each new contribution to be docketed orally as it was reported. We note that numbered formulas are used in exposition *before* their number is, as section, begun. The Bojjhanga's for instance appear in A. i. 14, but not as numbered; in the Sixes they appear as 'seven'; they come as titular into the Sevens none the less.

But this is not to deny, in the sweepers who revised, not collected, action that looks suspiciously like 'making good', when a certain section, say the Fours, had been 'closed', and certain numbered doctrines had *thereafter become of titular merit*. We have only to refer to the way in which the Satippaṭṭhāna's get no titular insertion in the Fours, but get it *nine times in the Nines*, when *coupled with a title of five other things*, making the number up to nine. Attention has never yet, I believe, been called to this. (Mine was too immature when I was compiling that Index of Subjects.) Or is there any other explanation?

How immature is not as yet all Piṭakan study! Shall we ever see any corporate effort in the historical excavation of the Pali Canon? The Pali Text Society is within a very few years of the completion of the task set it by its Founder: is there any hope, that our successors will rally to organize such a work?

INDEX

- AIM, 15, 16, 27, 54, 77 ff.
 Amity, 95 f.
 Analysts, 10, 100
 Animism, 21
 Antitheistic, original Buddhism
 not, 13, 23
 Arahan, 103
 Asokan Edicts, 28, 49 f.
 Becoming, 17 ff., 26 f., 62 f., 124 f.
 and Way, 70
 more-becoming, 30, 39
 wheel of, 67
 Brahnavihāra, 92 ff.
 CARAVAN, 64
 Causation, 72 ff.
 Chinese Buddhism, 10 f.
 Choose, 30
 Compassion, 119 f.
 DESIRE, 29, 58 f.
 Dhamma, 16, 41, 44 ff.
 as conscience, 47; as duty, 47;
 as successor, 51, 101
 EARNESTNESS, 84
 Edmunds, A. J., 68
 Effort, 29 f.
 Enlightenment, 16 f.
 FORMULAS, later growth. *See*
 Appendix
 GOAL. *See* Aim
 Gotama, 14; as inspired, 21 f.;
 as student, 53; positive in
 teaching, 59; as Buddha,
 97 ff.; death of, 104 f.;
 silence of, 106 ff.
 Growth, 63
 HARE, E. M., 122
 Hesitation, 16-22
 IDDLI, 25, 86
 Ill, 16, 27, 33, 52 ff., 107, 126
 Immanence, 23, 34, 42
 Immortal, the, 19 f., 39, 47, 72,
 74 f., 127
 Initiative, 42 f.
 JHĀNA, 127. *See* Musing
 Joy to come, 90
 KHANDHAS, 111 ff.
 LAST TOUR, 104
 MAHĀYANA, 9 f., 23, 49
 Man, the 'real,' 117
 Marks, three, 115 f.
 Monasticism, growing vogues,
 10 *passim*
 Most and More, 23 f., 35, 39, 65,
 82 f., 110
 Musing, 85 ff.
 NIRVANA, 78, 81, 127
 Norm, 45 f.
 OMNISCIENCE, 16
 PALI, 12
 Pīṭakas, 12
 Potential, 25, 30
 REFUGES, 101 f.
 SAKYANS, 14, 24
 Samsāra, 76
 Self, 32 f., 36 ff., 126; and
 dhamma, 46 f.
 Soul, 23, 32 ff.
 Spirit, 39 f.
 Sympathy, 119 f.
 'TING' AND THING, 47 f.
 Transience, 28
 Tribunal, post mortem, 89
 'Truths,' 58
 VINNĀNA, 63, 112, 114
 WAYFARING, 20, 48, 61 ff., 126 f.
 Will, 15, 16 f., 25 f., 29, 93
 Winternitz, 123
 Witnesses, 41, 44
 Woodward, F. L., 122
 YOGA, 87 f.